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LIKE EVERY ONE else I have been thinking a good deal of late about research, methodology, and the like, and it has occurred to me that a promising way to approach the matter would be to ask, What is the most successful work of research that American sociology has produced? No doubt opinions would differ about this, but it seems to me, on reflection, that if a vote were taken, bearing in mind that the question refers to factual methods and results as distinguished from more speculative sociology, a plurality of the voters, if not a majority, would probably be found to favor Sumner's *Folkways*. Let us assume, at any rate, that this is the case and ask ourselves, What can we learn about methodology from Sumner? What sort of work is *Folkways* and how was it produced?

What strikes me most strongly when I consider this question is that *Folkways* does not conform to any of the current canons of methodology. It is not *quantitative*; it does not proceed by the *statistical method*; it is not made up of *case studies*; it is not *psychoanalytic*, nor yet *behavioristic*, according to the doctrine of the sect that goes by that name, since much of the material it uses is based on sympathetic imagination. Moreover, it is not in any great measure a work of direct observation at all! It is almost all second hand. And, last and worst, its objectivity is

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* Remarks made at the annual dinner of the American Sociological Society, December, 1927.
open to question. There is reason to think that Sumner was by no means an unbiassed man, but was, on the contrary, noted for a somewhat dogmatic individualism and pessimism that were not without influence upon his treatment of the folkways.

Just before I left home I read an article in one of our leading sociological journals by one of the most distinguished writers, in which he maintains that institutions, groups, folkways, and that sort of thing are not real in a scientific sense at all. If Sumner had been living at the present time and had had the advantage of consulting this author he might have learned, apparently, that the object of his studies simply did not exist, at least for science, and so might have spared himself the trouble of pursuing them further.

Nearly all that I have said of Sumner's Folkways might also be said of Darwin's Origin of Species, which, so far as method is concerned, was a work of much the same character. They are both books in which the author seems quite regardless of everything except collecting the greatest possible body of pertinent facts and striving to make out what they mean.

You may say, perhaps, that Sumner (like Darwin) was a pioneer, and that what did well enough in those rude times must be given up in these riper days when we are hoping to develop our subject into a real science. But does any one doubt that if a book of the same force, originality, and wealth of suggestion were to appear now it would have just as much success? Or that people would care as little about the orthodoxy of the method as they did twenty years ago?

Well, what does all this mean as regards methodology? Certainly not that it is unimportant; perhaps merely that we should not take the methodological dogmatist too seri-
ousely. I am not sure but that methodology is a little like religion. It is something we need every day, something we are irresistibly impelled to talk and think about, but regarding which we never seem to reach a definite conclusion. Each one, if he is clever, works out something adequate for his own use, but the more general principles remain unsettled. Others help us far more by their example than by their theory. It would appear that a working methodology is a residue from actual research, a tradition of laboratories and work in the field: the men who contributed to it did so unconsciously, by trying to find out something that they ardently wanted to know. If other sciences have more than ours it is because they have a longer record of achievement.

To return to Sumner. I think I see at least two inferences that we can well draw from his case. The first regards the power of an abundant factual material. It is this, together with his vigorous personality and style, that more than anything else gives Sumner his immense influence. There are pages of facts, fresh, fascinating, well presented facts, for each idea. You are led to assimilate the subject in a natural, enjoyable way. It took great patience to accumulate all this material, and admirable reserve to withhold and brood over it until his ideas were mature and fit to shape into a lucid book. If he had been anxious to be known as a "research man," eager to get credit for his work as soon as he had done it, if not before, he could never have attained any such success. Perhaps this is a trait of methodology about which young students might concern themselves more than they do.

Another lesson is the old one of self-reliance. It is a matter of history that every one who has done anything important in the past has done it partly by resisting immediate and contemporary influences and finding a way of
his own. There are plenty of us elders eager to tell the young student just what to do and how to do it. He can learn a great deal from us, no doubt, but only on condition that he rely first of all on his own judgment and common sense. The best authorities agree that science is nothing more than common sense refined and perfected, and if a rule of methodology appears, on fair consideration, to be opposed to common sense, he is safe, I think, in disregarding it.

It is always wise, in your own development, to retain the initiative. In my opinion a young man should not go to a teacher and say, "Give me a research project and show me how to work it out," nor should a teacher countenance any such attitude. If the student is to do anything important it will be rooted in his own life, and his first task is to discover and develop the germ. Let him retire into the wilderness, if necessary, and mature his purpose. When he goes to a teacher he should be able to say, "I know in a general way what I want to find out, and I have prepared a tentative plan for doing so. I should be glad to have your opinion as to what I have done and how I may proceed with it." It is easy to help those who can help themselves.
In the present outline I am taking for granted:

1. That purely objective criminological research is the necessary foundation of all useful legislative and efficient social reform in this field, but that it can fulfill this function only if carried on for its own sake, without direct reference to practical purposes and under its own purely theoretic standards.

2. That criminological research, like every scientific research, should unconditionally aim at the highest attainable scientific exactness, not only in describing the facts but in explaining them causally.

3. That, although the materials with which the student of crime has to deal are particular concrete objects and happenings occurring at certain moments of time in certain communities, his ultimate purpose in studying these materials is to separate the essential from the accidental and thus to obtain generalizations which will prove applicable to all similar objects and happenings whenever and wherever they occur. He must leave to the legislator and the social reformer the task of drawing from these generalizations such conclusions as the particular conditions of the given society at the given period require.

The obvious consequence of my first assumption is that in studying crime we should beware of being influenced by any views of legislators or social reformers which might induce us to employ in the statement of our problems prac-
tical categories not fitted for scientific purposes. For instance, we should not begin by classifying crime under the paragraphs of the penal code. Society in generalizing certain acts and applying to them a certain category of punishment is exclusively interested in such features of these acts as have a practical bearing upon some classes of values which it recognizes as important, e.g., private property, sexual mores, religion, governmental institutions, life and health of group members. But it is by no means certain that these features are always the most significant theoretically, that they are the ones which will help us most in describing and explaining such acts. Undoubtedly, the very fact that such a classification exists raises a problem; but it is more than probable that there are many other theoretic problems concerning crime which can be adequately solved only if the student ignores the divisions of the penal code and begins by studying every criminal act on its own merits, so to speak, without attempting to classify it until he has found out with what other acts it should be compared in order to understand such of its aspects as need explanation.

My second postulate requires that we should apply the highest possible standards, both in describing and in explaining facts. Exact descriptions of the external aspect of criminal acts are, indeed, found in police records; the facts they give, though adequate to qualify the crime legally and eventually to detect the criminal, are nevertheless far from sufficient to characterize either the crime or the criminal as data for scientific investigation. It is impossible to understand either without a thorough knowledge of certain essential facts concerning the psychological and sociological background of the criminal act, the personality of the criminal as determined by his past, his relations with his social milieu, etc. This knowledge can-
not be gained except by the help of a systematic technique for collecting all the materials which may prove necessary. Such a technique is beginning to be elaborated, though almost exclusively in America. Older criminologists were for the most part satisfied with commonplace generalities or detached bits of concrete detail which casually reached them.

Furthermore—and this is a point I wish to emphasize particularly—the main purpose of all science is to determine the causal relations between facts. Science, as distinct from philosophy and history, is theoretically valid and practically useful in the measure in which it succeeds in achieving this purpose. Sociology should follow in this respect the standards of other older and more perfect sciences. Thus, in trying to explain such facts as particular criminal acts, individual criminal careers, the reaction of communities to law-breaking and law-enforcement, etc., it has no right to be satisfied by merely showing that these facts depend upon a number of "co-operating factors" or "contributing causes," the relative importance of which may vary from case to case and the precise effect of any one of which separately remains undetermined and changing.

In sciences which, like physics and chemistry, have attained sufficient exactness in determining causal relations to satisfy the demands of both logical norms and technical needs, a causal relation is considered certain only if it can be formulated as a scientific law from which there are no exceptions that cannot be explained with the help of other causal laws. In studying crime we also should aim at the discovery of laws stating that, whenever and wherever a certain cause A occurs, a certain effect B must inevitably follow unless interfered with by some other definite effect D of some other equally definite cause C.
The obvious difficulty in achieving this purpose is the complexity of the data which the criminologist finds in beginning his research; but its very obviousness should stimulate efforts to overcome it. Here our third postulate comes into play.

It is clear, for instance, that the concrete fact of committing a criminal action at a certain time and place cannot be causally explained in the exact sense of the term, for no causal law is possible which could assume that such a fact must always and necessarily follow some other fact. Innumerable factors are involved in this happening. On the one hand, there is the entire psychology of the individual who committed this action, including his innate dispositions and all the influences to which he has been subject from his childhood up to the moment preceding his crime; on the other hand, there are all the external conditions, present and past, of the particular situation which the individual tried to solve by his crime. An individual with a different inborn nature or with a different upbringing would not have committed the crime in the same external conditions, and the same individual in different conditions would have done something else. Though in popular reflection we ignore most of these antecedents and take into account only a few of them which seem to us "most important," judging from our previous observations and experiences, science cannot be satisfied with such arbitrary and vague approximations.

But the same problem confronts every science at the outset of every investigation. The concrete fact as it actually occurs at any given time and place—say, a thunderstorm breaking out, or a plant withering—is not explicable by its antecedents, for there are always innumerable factors contributing to its occurrence; exactly speaking, it is the outcome of the entire past of the world. The only
thing science can do is to analyze this fact into repeatable elements, to isolate by special methods certain simple changes occurring in many similar facts, and to trace each such specific change back to its specific cause. Thus, by experimentally isolating certain elementary processes occurring in a thunderstorm, instead of trying to explain the occurrence as a whole, physics has discovered the laws of electricity; by paying attention to certain changes of organic decay involved, among others, in the complex fact of the withering of plants, biology is discovering certain laws of organic life.

In criminal research we should follow these examples. While the nature of our facts precludes material experiment, it does not prevent us from applying in our field the same logic which the physicist and the biologist use in their experiments. The logic of the experiment consists in simplifying the conditions in which certain facts occur; the scientist builds a definite and limited system of objects cut off from irrelevant external influences, and investigates the changes which are going on in this system, trying to determine their causal relations. The sociologist can do something similar with less difficulty, for he does not need to build close systems artificially; he finds them ready-made in social life. Man in his individual and collective behavior is continually constructing and reconstructing limited systems of objects which he intentionally tries to keep undisturbed by external influences. All the scientist needs to do is to determine by exact observation and analysis what these systems are, and to study by comparative method the processes which occur within them.

In the complex facts of crime there are several distinct varieties of social systems involved, and accordingly several classes of elementary changes to be studied. At the present stage of research, it might be best to concentrate
our attention on the two which are relatively the simplest: the crime as a social action, and the social personality of the criminal.

I

Every crime is obviously an action. Human actions as a rule follow definite patterns. In starting an action the subject intends to satisfy a certain specific tendency (hunger, sexual impulse, greed, desire for recognition), and defines in a certain typical way the practical situation in connection with which this tendency will actually achieve satisfaction; he selects the object which is to be modified, determines the expected result of this modification, chooses the instrumental process by which this result will be brought about, eventually imagines the effect this action will have upon his reflected self. All these elements are interdependent: the situation is defined with reference to the tendency, and vice versa, the tendency is active with reference to the situation; within the situation the object, the expected result, the instrumental process, eventually the reflected self, depend upon one another. Thus, all these elements constitute a system which is usually more or less closely modelled upon other similar actions of the same subject or of others.

The subject tries to maintain this system such as it is against all disturbing influences until the action is achieved; that is, while acting he keeps as far as possible his tendency, his object, his expected result, his instrumental process free from any changes except those which the very course of his action is meant to produce. He suppresses other tendencies which may interfere with the satisfaction of the present one; he avoids, or overcomes, unexpected external conditions which prove an obstacle to the solution of the practical problem as it has been defined.
In so far the action, as long as it lasts, is a closed system like the laboratory experiment of a physicist or a biologist. Nevertheless, it often happens that unexpected outside factors do influence certain elements of the action, either at its very beginning or in the course of its achievement. In this case certain other elements of the action undergo a change. Particularly important are such changes of the situation as produce changes of the tendency. It is possible to determine exactly and to express in the form of a causal law the effect which in a certain kind of action a definite change of the situation will produce upon the tendency.¹

With regard to criminal actions two kinds of causal problems may be put on the basis of this conception. A criminal action is, like every action, an attempt to satisfy a certain tendency by defining and solving a certain situation. This “criminal” tendency may be either a secondary product of certain influences to which the individual has been subjected, or a primary inborn tendency of the individual.

In the former case, our problem is to find when and how and in the course of what actions this criminal, socially undesirable tendency has been produced in consequence of some change of another, socially normal, non-criminal tendency. Such a change sometimes happens at the very moment preceding the performance of the criminal act, as when a hitherto peaceable individual under unusual provocation commits an act of violence. Sometimes, again, this kind of change occurs long before the crime, and the criminal tendency remains socially unexpressed until a proper opportunity is found, as when an individual develops a wish for revenge, but gives it expression only in day

¹ See the author's Laws of Social Psychology (Chicago, 1925).
dreams until the object of the wish comes within his reach. In either eventuality the change may take place suddenly or gradually through a series of partial modifications. But the essential point is to determine exactly its cause, and this can be done only if we succeed in reconstructing the circumstances in which it has occurred. There must have been some action or a series of actions which the individual wished to achieve, but was prevented by outside influences. These influences by modifying the situation as defined by him modified his tendency, making him a criminal in intention, though perhaps not at once in act. If his new criminal tendency found some vicarious satisfaction or was temporarily inhibited, it might remain latent for many a month or year until some additional cause produced the outbreak.

In the second case, when the criminal tendency is inborn, the problem is different. We all have inborn tendencies which, if given unrestricted active expression, would lead to acts which society considers criminal. But with most of us conscious or unconscious social education succeeds in so modifying these tendencies as to make them socially harmless or even useful. Occasionally, however, it fails entirely and the criminal tendency, after perhaps expressing itself in actions which, though not differing from crimes in their subjective significance, have no objective social consequences important enough to be brought under legal repression, finally finds its way in some action which on account of its results society penalizes. Sometimes, again, the inborn criminal tendency becomes only externally repressed, prevented from outward manifestations, but not internally inhibited; it preserves its dynamic character, it smoulders in hidden revolt, and may break out any time, if the powers of repression are, or seem to be, removed. The problem of criminology is, then, to trace
back the history of the criminal tendency through its past manifestations in the life of the individual, to find whether, when, and in what ways, his social milieu has attempted to modify it, to show why these attempts have been unsuccessful, and to determine what real effects they produced instead of the desired ones.

The explanation of the change of a non-criminal tendency into a criminal one or of the failure to change a criminal tendency into a non-criminal one must be, of course, scientifically exact; that is, the relation between cause and effect must be determined in such a way as to make it a particular instance of a general causal law. For example, suppose we find that the tendency to steal manifested in a criminal act originated in a socially normal desire to obtain certain economic values by exchange, and that its appearance was due to the realization that the subject’s social environment did not want the values he had to offer. To make this explanation certain we should be able to say that such a process is a necessary succession of cause and effect, that whenever and wherever the active expression of a similar economic tendency is interfered with in a similar way, this tendency to steal must appear (unless its appearance is counteracted by the necessary effect of some other cause). Or, suppose we come to the conclusion that past attempts of the social milieu to modify inborn murderous proclivities of the subject have failed because, instead of inhibiting them by bringing them into conflict with equally inborn sympathetic tendencies, the social milieu merely repressed them by violence and thus fostered the spirit of revolt. This conclusion must be corroborated by showing that in other similar cases a similar educational method produces similar effects, whereas the opposite method of avoiding violent repression and bringing strong positive tendencies into conflict with the unde-
sirable negative ones always inhibits the latter. In short, every individual case should be treated as a particular instance either confirming some general causal law already known or leading to the discovery of a new law.

Such an investigation presupposes the possession of very rich and reliable biographical materials concerning the past of a number of criminals and also of normal persons. Emphasis must be put not on the quantity of cases, but on the thorough acquaintance with each case under observation. In physics or chemistry two or three well-conducted experiments are sufficient to establish a causal law. In sociology, taking into account the greater complexity of data and the increased difficulty of observation, from a dozen to a score of instances methodically studied and compared should answer the same purpose.

II

In studying the criminal as a person the sociologist must leave to the biologist and the psychologist all matters pertaining to man as a natural being—his organic constitution, his psychological dispositions and abilities, his heredity, etc. Within the scope of sociology lies only the social existence of the individual. This existence is determined on its objective side by the status which the social milieu gives an individual as member of a group and holder of a certain position within this group, and on its subjective side by his own behavior as he fulfills, or fails to fulfill, the cultural functions imposed upon him by others or freely chosen by himself.

Now, a criminal as a social person may be viewed either as a deviation from a certain normal cultural type or as a distinct cultural type. The former point of view should be taken when we are studying the occasional criminal, the
latter when we investigate the professional criminal. For
with the occasional criminal, apart from the psychological
facts involved in his crime, the important problem is his
deviation from the social function he performed and the
loss of the social status he possessed before his crime;
whereas crime is the specific social function of the profes-
sional criminal upon which depends his status in a certain
social milieu.

1. Every individual is a member of several social groups
—church, nation, community, professional organization,
economic association, etc.,—and usually occupies one or
more special positions, is an employer or employee, a prop-
erty-owner, a councilman, a churchwarden, secretary of an
association, etc. To each membership and to each special
position corresponds a certain model of behavior with
which the group expects him to comply and with which
normally he does comply, more or less adequately realizing
in his person the cultural type of a Christian, an American,
a community member, a farmer or a tradesman, a house-
owner, an official. If an individual is socially qualified as
a criminal, this very fact, independently of the psychologi-
cal background of his crime and the particular norm which
he has broken, destroys entirely this complex fabric of his
social status and function. In the eyes of every group to
which he belongs the fact that he is a criminal deprives him
of each and all of the typical cultural characters which he
represented. He ceases to be a Christian (though there
may be some hope of converting him again); he is not
worthy to be considered a representative American; the
community is indignant if any one treats him as a typical
community member; the state, the neighborhood, the pro-
fessional group, withdraw their positive sanction from his
occupational activities; he loses the right to hold any pub-
lic position; even his rights as a property-owner are sus-
pended or diminished. He becomes thus literally a social outcast.

The importance of this uprooting of the social personality depends, of course, on the depth and ramifications of the roots which this personality has taken in society. Its exact appreciation would be clearly impossible, for it would involve the study not only of the objective standing of the individual in various groups, but also of the subjective meaning which this standing has for him personally. To one man, for instance, membership in a church may be of supreme significance, whereas to another it may mean very little. The same profession may be for one man an all-absorbing occupation, for another merely a possible means of livelihood.

Luckily, we do not need to investigate these matters in order to solve the problem which is most important both scientifically and practically—the problem of the causes which lead the individual to risk the destruction of his social personality by committing a crime. For whatever importance his social standing has for him, the importance of these causes must be proportionate to it. A man who does not take his religious or professional rôle seriously will be much more easily led to commit a crime which will invalidate any claims he may have to represent the religious or professional ideal type, and will think much less of the chance that his crime will be discovered and of the social consequences of discovery, than another for whom a similar position is deeply vital. The question of quantity can and should be eliminated from this—as from every other sociological explanation. We are facing a purely qualitative problem; given a certain kind of effect A, what kind of cause produces it; and given a certain kind of cause B, what kind of effect does it produce.

From this point of view crime appears as a resignation of one's social personality—actual in so far as one's own
personal ideals are concerned, potential in so far as the reaction of the social milieu upon a possible discovery is taken into consideration. Those various social types which taken together constitute the subject's social personality have become in the course of his life mutually dependent, as parts of his life organization. The resignation of one's social personality implies that some cause has shaken the very foundations of the subject's life organization. It will be explained, therefore, if we find, first, what was this basis, i.e., that part of the individual's social personality with reference to which all its other elements were organized; secondly, what was the process which changed this basis so deeply as to make it unfit to play the part of personality center.

To illustrate by a few examples. In studying the European peasant farmer, we find that the basis of his life organization is usually the possession and cultivation of land, which is not merely an economic matter, but a definite social position and function. Any factor which destroys or threatens to destroy this basis disorganizes the man's social personality; and if then criminal tendencies appear, their active expression is unchecked by any consideration of social consequences. Such, indeed, is the background of the great majority of important crimes committed by peasants; we usually find that these crimes have been preceded by economic ruin, loss of a lawsuit about land, supposedly unjust distribution of property by the parents among their children, a father's claim to control the farm after having ceded it to the son, etc. Perhaps the most striking instance is a case which recently attracted much attention here. A peasant shot and killed another peasant who refused to sell his farm at the price agreed upon. I interviewed the murderer in prison and found him a quiet, even meek, person; but he still felt that his victim had provoked him be-
beyond endurance, because after a long and trying period of bargaining when the price was finally fixed and the money gotten together with great efforts, the man refused to give up the land according to the agreement. On further inquiry it appeared that he had sold his own farm some time before and in the upset conditions following the war had been unable to buy another one, meanwhile living provisionally in town without any occupation. Since his social personality had been organized with reference to his vocation as a farmer, this period of searching and waiting undermined his whole life organization. His effort to buy the farm in question was an attempt to recover his social normality, and the frustration of this attempt appeared at the moment as a real catastrophe due to the bad will of the seller.

Soldiers demobilized after long service, and unmarried trained workmen without employment, easily give way to criminal tendencies, because for both categories the professional standing and function is fundamental and after this loss the social personality breaks up into disconnected fragments. If in most cases criminal tendencies become nevertheless inhibited, it is because the social personality soon becomes reorganized around a new basis. The ex-soldier returns to his pre-war occupation, or marries; the discharged workman becomes absorbed in political activities, etc.

2. Very different is the significance of crime for the professional criminal. Far from uprooting the social personality of the individual, it is a means of expressing his social function and confirming his social position. Studies of criminal groups, from the mountain bandits of half-civilized countries to city gangs, have clearly shown that it is entirely misleading to treat the professional criminal as an outcast of society in general, with no definite social posi-
tion. He is simply living in a social milieu distinct from the milieux of "law-abiding citizens," sometimes sharply separated from them, oftener gradually merging into them. This milieu is sufficient to satisfy his social aspirations, and the part which he plays in it constitutes a basis for the organization of his social personality. The same behavior which in another group would qualify him as an outcast is here considered normal, and far from making him lose his standing contributes to establish it.

A sociological study of the professional criminal should center around the problem, Why did his social personality become organized on the basis of a criminal status and function rather than on any of the numerous other foundations which the civilization of his epoch and nation permits? Since the individual's social personality depends on the groups to which he belongs and on the positions which are assigned to him in these groups, this problem resolves itself into another: what were the groups and the positions to which the individual had access in his life, and why did he finally become a member of a criminal milieu rather than of a normal milieu?

3. Condemnation of a criminal to prison marks the starting-point of an entirely new period in his social life. He is excluded from his previous milieu and introduced into a distinct and specific milieu; he is socially qualified as a particular cultural type, "a prisoner," and is expected to organize his personal life on the basis of the status and function which this qualification imposes upon him. The effect of this change upon his social personality, such as it was before his imprisonment, is another sociological problem which needs investigation.

4. Finally, a new problem is raised by the fact that the condemned criminal after serving his term in prison must again reorganize his social personality. This, however, is
a very complex matter, for in shaping the personality of the released prisoner his present combines with his past, before and after condemnation.

It is clear that in limiting this problem to the study of the criminal action and the personality of the criminal we leave out of consideration the collective aspect of the total complex of facts in which criminal legislation, jurisdiction, and reform are interested. Of course, crime can be viewed not only with regard to the socio-psychological tendencies of the criminal himself, but also with reference to the supra-individual conditions in which it is committed—in particular, to those social norms which it breaks. Likewise, the existence of the criminal is significant not only on account of his own personality, but also because it has a bearing upon the composition and organization of those social groups in which he participates or from which he becomes excluded.

Therefore, even if we should succeed finally in subordinating to causal laws the processes involved in the criminal action and in the changes of the criminal’s personality, there will still be many problems left which will have to be solved later, if social practice is to obtain complete control of this field. However, there is no field of social life which can be rationally controlled all at once in its totality. The rationalization of social practice should proceed slowly and gradually by using every causal law which science discovers as a foundation for some specific and limited reform. Modern practical thought should realize that wholesale programs for social betterment are as much out of date as those wholesale systems of human knowledge which the old philosophers used to build.
SCHOLARSHIP IN SOCIOLOGY

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In AMERICAN usage a learner in the lower schools is called a “pupil”; one pursuing knowledge at the college or university level is referred to as a “student”; while one who has finished his schooling and is thought to have become a master of what the schools can teach, is honored with the older title of “scholar.” A scholar in this sense is “one distinguished for the pursuit and possession of knowledge; a person of high attainments.” (Standard Dictionary). “Accurate and well-disciplined learning, especially in the liberal studies” (Webster’s New International Dictionary) is held to be a distinguishing trait.

Of recent years the scope of the word has widened, along with the democratization of the whole educational system itself. Nevertheless, there still lurks a shadow of the earlier attitude, as reflected in the above-quoted phrase, “especially in the liberal studies.” It is common knowledge that there was a time-when to be a scholar meant to be able to prate of Greek and Latin writers, and to quote phrases, on occasion, from those dead tongues. In more recent days the modern European languages have been admitted to the scholastic circle, so that an occasional French or German phrase may now be accepted as a badge of true scholarship. Along with this conception of educa-

1 Semi-Annual Academic Address before the Initiation Banquet of the University of Southern California Chapter of Alpha Kappa Delta, Sociology Honor Society, November 4, 1927.
tion went proficiency in literature, art, mathematics, and philosophy, and a mark of the scholar was his familiarity with the great masterpieces of philosophical or artistic genius of the past.

Now it is evident that there is no room, in the field of sociology, for scholarship in this latter sense, and for at least two reasons. In the first place, sociology is itself a child of the modern movement for the study of more immediately interesting and utilitarian subjects along with, or even instead of, the more ornamental and remote. The whole spirit of sociological inquiry is inimical to the notion of education and scholarship as the esoteric culture of a privileged class, and is fully imbued with the conviction of Sir Francis Bacon that knowledge should be pursued primarily for the utilitarian service of mankind.²

In the second place, even if sociological scholarship were held to consist in familiarity with the great masterpieces in this particular field of thought, where might the would-be scholar hope to find them? The list of sociological classics would be a very short one, even if such distinguished works could be said to exist in this field at all. It would be an interesting experiment to obtain, from American sociologists, a list of sociological works, by Americans, regarded as worthy to be counted sociological classics indispensable to the training of every scholar in this subject. To make the task simple, one might ask for a bare half-dozen. In that case, what would be named? and would the six niches all be filled? If the inquiry were extended, as it certainly should be, to Europe, the situation would remain essentially unaltered.

The student of the history of sociological thought must necessarily be impressed with the fact that sociological

writings have always tended to be more voluminous than valuable, and closer examination will suggest that this tendency is becoming more pronounced within the last few years. So far as quantity itself goes, the present period, beginning with 1921, is perhaps the most productive epoch in American sociology. But comparison of the product with that of the first decade of this century will reveal a much smaller percentage of notable works. If it be true that, for the time being at least, the quality of American sociological writing is in inverse ratio to its quantity, the reason is to be sought, among other things, in the fact, first, that the system of promotion used in our universities amounts to the warning, "Publish or perish!" In the second place, publication in general is more easy than formerly; and in the third place, there is an insistent demand for sociological text-books on the part of the great publishing houses, many of whom are busily creating what they call "Social Science Series," in which they and their respective corps of authors are industriously duplicating one another's output.

Multiplication of ephemeral writings is a phenomenon that occurs in all fields of human speculation and research. So, while sociology may present a conspicuous example, it is by no means the only one.

The particular bearing of this situation upon the subject of the present paper involves the part we should expect the history of sociological thought, as an academic subject of study, to play in the perfecting of finished scholarship in sociology. Viewed from this standpoint the problem is a pedagogical one. We already possess several excellent general text-books, and the monographic literature is increasing. The difficulty lies in the vast amount of sociological literature to be surveyed, combined with the fact that so much of it represents huge stacks of straw and
stubble which must be laboriously threshed and winnowed in order to find the golden grains of truth concealed within it.

This difficulty is aggravated by the tendency of different groups of sociologists to develop their own peculiar terminology. Lester F. Ward recognized and condemned this form of intellectual provincialism several decades ago, but did not succeed in abolishing it. Nevertheless, he perhaps was partly instrumental in checking it, for it is now a question of divergence between schools rather than individuals; and is to that extent less atomistic.

Within the last year or two several sociologists in this country have begun, independently, an effort to take stock of the concepts now in use among their contemporaries. This is significant, but the effort has to face the fact just noted, which renders it almost impossible to select terms which are really used with the same meaning by sociologists at large. If it proves possible to identify a respectable set of definite concepts the next step will be the production of a history of sociological thought along new lines. Hitherto such histories have followed the chronological, biographical plan, which was, and still is, the only feasible one. But with a suitably large collection of actually working concepts the time may sometime be ripe for a conceptual treatment, or in other words, a history not of men or a description of their works in their entirety, but a history of the development of sociological concepts, studied for their own sake and pursued wherever, and only where, they appear in literature. This would result in a study similar in method to Windelband's History of Philosophy, which is strictly a story of the development of certain ideas and systems of philosophical character. Such a sociological work might better be the product of collaboration on the part of several authors, and should be supplemented
with a source-book or dictionary, giving interesting facts about the writers studied, their works, and their times.

I have been led into these reflections by a feeling that there is in evidence among sociologists, particularly those of most recent vintage, an attitude of contempt for the works belonging to different schools of thought, which is very hard to reconcile with any ideal of true scholarship. It seems to me that genuine scholarship carries with it an atmosphere of catholicity. In other words, it partakes of a universal spirit, and being universal it is necessarily tolerant even where not appreciative. Certain criticisms in earlier paragraphs may seem to be incompatible with this position, but I do not understand that catholicity requires undiscriminating approval. It simply calls for acquaintance with the works of one's predecessors, and a fair evaluation of their achievement in the light of the times in which they wrought. But to do that one must have some perspective, and I do not see how to obtain it without some attention to the history of sociological thought. How to obtain this discipline when the time is already too limited and the mass of materials to be surveyed is constantly increasing constitutes one of the difficulties to be met in the production of sociological scholarship.

Permit me now to direct attention to another aspect of sociological scholarship which is of greater importance than the one already discussed. I mean the effort to understand society itself, rather than the writings of other men about society. The latter is after all a somewhat academic, or at most scholastic, enterprise. It might produce literary sociologists, not necessarily equipped with any degree of mastery over the actual situations of social life. But scholarship, as herein apprehended, implies not only erudition but competency. We should think of it in terms of adequacy, in the highest mental significance of the word.
In other words, the supreme task of scholarship in sociology is not merely to understand the literature of sociology, but to understand the special order of natural phenomena which forms the object-matter of the science of society, or whatever we should call this form of human inquiry. No doubt sociology has made considerable and even accelerating progress in a strictly verbal sense, but the vital question is whether it has made any real headway toward an understanding of the “socio-historical actuality” itself, as the German philosopher and sociologist Simmel has termed it. That is to say, we are trying to learn something about an actually existing field of interrelated phenomena. That field is the realm of human group life, so it is social. It is also a thing that has “become,” and is still “becoming,” so it is also historical. Furthermore, this becoming, that is to say, changing and developing, thing is at bottom a thing of personalities and of human values, so it is also ethical in some of its aspects.

The question I would raise now is whether we have made any substantial headway toward the understanding of this “socio-historical actuality” which has been challenging sociologists since man first became conscious of his group-experience and desirous of comprehending it. Moreover, by “comprehending” it I mean to include ability to predict concerning sociological phenomena, and also to control them. The question then becomes one of scholarship in a quite different sense. As stated in the outset, it was the inquiry about sociological scholarship in so far as it concerns erudition in sociological literature and a broadly catholic spirit in evaluating it. Now it becomes the question whether sociologists as a whole are gaining any sort of command over the actually existing thing they started out to study, which is the life that men live in groups.
I shall not attempt to answer this question, because it would involve an evaluation of the work of my contemporaries such as I am not qualified to undertake. Instead, let me now try to sketch some of the outlines of the task before us, and then conclude by simply pointing to some qualifications of the sociological scholar, which are suggested by the nature of the task itself. In attempting this, it will be necessary first to notice the form in which the central task of sociology has come to be stated by some leading thinkers.

The word 'process' has come into increasingly frequent use among philosophers and sociologists, especially the latter, in recent years. Professor Albion W. Small was among the first to make large use of the term. He always applied it in the singular number, and is constantly speaking of the social process. Professor Charles H. Cooley drops the article and writes a whole book about social process without any qualifying or limiting adjectives whatsoever. Meanwhile, Professor Edward A. Ross has been going ahead singling out and illustrating separate and distinct (though interrelated) processes in the plural, until at the publication of his Principles of Sociology in 1920 he had identified and named no less than thirty-eight, each giving its name to a chapter.

Small defines a process in general as "a collection of occurrences, each of which has a meaning for every other, the whole of which constitutes some sort of becoming." He adds that "human association is such a process." In another passage he says, "The use of the word is immaterial. The possession of the idea, the perception of the relation between portions of experience, is essential. We do not represent human experience as it is, unless we think of it as a factor in a process composed of all human expe-
rience.״ His more explicit definition of the social process is "the incessant evolution of persons through the evolution of institutions, which evolve completer persons, who evoke completer institutions, and so on beyond any limit that we can fix.״

We see in these brief passages, as appears also from a survey of Small’s books and numerous other articles and reviews, that his point of view was strongly historical and somewhat philosophical. Thus, in replying to a newspaper discussion on the nature of a “sociologist,” Small said: “In general . . . a sociologist is a man who is studying the facts of society in a certain way.” That way he finds to be in the spirit of a philosopher.” More explicitly, he holds that “the name ‘sociologist’ belongs, then, to all students of society who think of human life, past, present, and future, as somehow bound together, and who try to understand any particular fragment of human life which they may study by making out its bearings upon and its being-borne-upon by all the rest of human life.” This sounds more like a synthesis than an analysis, more like philosophy than science; which Small tacitly admits when he adds, “The sociologist is the man who tries to fill the place in our scientific age which the old-fashioned philosopher occupied in the ages of metaphysical speculation.”

In a later article Professor Small sought to define the scope of sociology itself, and in so doing proposed the following Herculean labors: “The desideratum is to be able to say for instance, ‘The American people are in such and such a situation; such and such are the chief issues now

3 General Sociology, p. 513. (Chicago, 1905.)
4 Ibid., p. 552.
5 In the American Journal of Sociology, which he founded and long edited.
pending; the other issues fall into such and such subordinate relations; in view of these facts the conduct of the American people should be turned in such and such directions, so as to procure such and such results."

This of course is a rôle requiring nothing less than social omniscience, but it illustrates the tremendously historical character of Small’s understanding of “the social process.” It is his name for a living, organic, interrelated whole, which moves forward in time, has the true, irreversible direction (from past into future) which goes with pure duration, and which gathers up and carries its own experience forward as it goes. He reiterates in his voluminous writings, almost to weariness, that it is one whole, and that every single part of it can, theoretically, be understood only in the light of its relation to every other part. If one were to seek an analogy in the organic world it would be the growth-process or life-history of a plant or animal; a process which begins, traverses stages which it never repeats or reverses, and comes to a definite ending and dissolution. One wonders whether society as thus viewed has necessarily its infancy, childhood, youth, maturity, decline, old age, senility, and death.

The terms used by Small and others are not so simple and unambiguous as they look. For instance, a “process of becoming” may mean any one of several things. Plants and animals do not “become” in the same way as do atoms in chemical combinations, or as do crystals when they “grow.” One does not have to qualify as a professional metaphysician to see this. An eminent naturalist, Professor J. Arthur Thomson, has discussed it in an admirable paper entitled “A Biologist’s Philosophy.”

7 American Journal of Sociology, X:26-46 (1904).
8 In Contemporary British Philosophy, edited by J. H. Muirhead, no date.
distinctly recognizes that "it makes for clearness to keep separate terms for the different processes of becoming, for they certainly differ as much as they agree. Organic evolution, individual development, human history, cosmic genesis, and chemical transformation are all very different."

Thomson and others have perceived that one distinctive peculiarity of living things is that their experience really counts. They gather up the effects of their own past and carry it forward cumulatively, into their own future. This, I suppose, is essentially what is meant by experience and history, and it explains why historical experience is always unique and irreversible.

Now there is nothing in all the world in which accumulated experience counts for so much as in what we call human society. The experience of countless generations piles up, accumulates, and is transmitted by tradition and by "the sheer objective continuity of material existence," to use Professor Goldenweiser's happy phrase. This accumulating stream of tools, symbols, and institutions constitutes culture, and its possession sets man in a class by himself, as I have argued elsewhere.

It becomes increasingly evident that the thing we have long called social evolution is pretty largely cultural evolution. And since culture is the distinctive possession of mankind it now appears that the science or sciences which study its origins and elaboration, "social progress" included, will have to develop distinctive methods and concepts suited to this unique phenomenon. Social experi-

9 Early Civilization, p. 16.
11 American ethnologists, among them A. L. Kroeber, R. H. Lowie, Clark Wissler, A. A. Goldenweiser, and their pioneer leader, Franz Boas, have been leaders in clearing up this problem.
ence is a seamless life-web, in which the group traditions and culture form the warp, and the personal experiences or life-histories of the individual members form the woof. That is to say, no life-history of a person can be understood apart from the historical culture of the group or groups in which it was lived, and through which it is intertwined as the woof winds through the warp. It is within this field of personal and group culture-experience that the necessary qualifications of a true sociological scholar will have to be suggested.

The one all-embracing social process of Small represents an historical evolution which cannot, being a historical series, reverse or repeat itself. Yet each one of the steps in this series might be broken, in turn, into a series of more minute steps, which series itself is irreversible, and so on indefinitely. These more minute steps are social processes in the plural, that is, characteristic, recurrent social changes. This twofold aspect suggests that the question whether any given process is historical, (i.e., irreversible, not recurrent, involving duration, and unique) or mechanical (i.e., reversible, recurrent, dateless, and not unique), depends upon the closeness with which it is viewed. The life of an organism of any kind thus seems to be made up of series of series, chains of chains, processes of processes without end. The further pursuit of this question would lead straight into the central problem of metaphysics, namely, that concerning the ultimate nature of reality itself. In this particular form it becomes the question whether the world is at bottom a composite of monads or a community of mutually interpreting signs or socii, as in the philosophy of Josiah Royce. 

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Such an inquiry lies beyond the aim or possibilities of this paper, but it may be not unprofitable for sociologists to recognize, as is all too seldom done, the logical implications and philosophical boundaries of their discussions. The present purpose is to note the fact that when we use the word "process," it may denote either the historical becoming of a comprehensive and unique society and culture, or the smaller, recurrent doings that take place within it. To appreciate the larger units of life requires the synthesizing work of art, religion, and philosophy, all of which aim to grasp the meaning of the whole. To understand the smaller units we have recourse to the analyzing, abstracting methods of science, which splits the world of phenomena into separable, countable, measurable, and ever more minute parts, and takes no thought for the whole. Science in its essential form gives us a raveled-out world, interpreted in abstract conceptions and symbols which enable us to deal successfully with, and even control, natural phenomena, but which are as far from constituting an adequate picture of the living concrete world as it appears to human consciousness, as are the bookkeeping entries in a rancher's office ledger from rendering a real portrayal of the cattle on a thousand hills. Yet this is the price we pay for our scientific method and control, and the more mechanistic we become the more we miss the rich meaning and significance of the concrete realities of the living world. As a living enterprise or stream of tendency a person or a social group moves forward in time with a more or less conscious purpose, which does not occupy space but which expresses itself through inorganic or dead matter distributed in space. The mechanistic scientist in psychology,

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13 I am unable at this writing to determine the source of this illustration, but suspect that it is at least suggested by an otherwise forgotten passage in Dr. James Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*.
by simplifying his units, gives a clear picture of its foot-
prints left by the way but never a glimpse of the living,
conscious, purposeful mind itself. At the present time
sociology is also tending toward so-called “scientific,”
which means mechanistic, methods. By stressing spatial
relations, boundaries, and “position” it is learning how to
give a clear and striking picture of the material forms of
social experience, of which forms the most that can be said
is that the life-force we seek passed along this way, but it
always vanishes just as we arrive. Such is the result of
“behaviorism” in psychology, and such is the promise of
the new “human ecology,” which is, apparently, in its es-
sential nature, a sociological behaviorism. It may show
us much about the forms and mechanism of social life,
and constitutes a very valuable contribution, but can
hardly reveal very much of the intimate, zestful, pungent
vital content that marks a person or a group as a really
living thing. As Spengler puts it: “History carries the
mark of the singular-factual; Nature (i.e., science) that of
the continuously possible.”

The two methods named, that of synthesis and that of
minute analysis, have both their bearing upon the study
of social progress, as a specific aspect of social process.
The extreme form of the synthetic, philosophical, historico-
artistic approach is exemplified in the work of Spengler,
already quoted. It cannot be stated better than in his own
words: “Wherever the sight emancipates itself from the
sensible-become, spiritualizes itself into vision, pene-
trates through the enveloping world and lets prime phe-
nomena instead of mere objects work upon it, we have the

14 In The Decline of the West. In this connection Dr. Carr's remark is signifi-
cant: “Herbert Spencer's principle of evolution never freed itself from the vice of
mechanical explanation. The future—and the past could all be calculated from the
present. All is given. Time does nothing, and therefore is nothing.” (Henri Berg-
grand *historical*, trans-natural, super-natural outlook, the outlook of Dante and Wolfram and also the outlook of Goethe in old age that is most clearly manifested in the finale of *Faust II.* By this method he would approach what to him means "the last great task of Western philosophy" which he envisions as "a hitherto unimagined mode of superlative historical research that is truly Western, necessarily alien to the Classical and to every other soul but ours—a comprehensive Physiognomic of all existence, a morphology of becoming for all humanity that drives onward to the highest and last ideas; a duty of penetrating the world-feeling not only of our proper soul but of all souls whatsoever that have contained grand possibilities and have expressed them in the field of actuality as grand Cultures."

At the other extreme from this magnificently panoramic and philosophical survey method stands the most recent tendency, represented by those sociologists who have discarded all philosophic and even ethical considerations, and are attempting sociological research by ultra-"scientific" methods of minute dissection and measurement in emulation of the procedure of physics, which is held up, most erroneously, as the ideal even for the social sciences. Probably both modes of approach are necessary for a complete comprehension of the socio-historical actuality, with the true mode of approach lying somewhere between them; but since this is not a discourse on method I need not on this occasion attempt an estimate of their respective applications and merits.

In the preceding excursus on the notion of social process I have attempted to suggest some necessary traits of the

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SCHOLARSHIP IN SOCIOLOGY

It is in a way self-imposed, but this does not alter the fact that he may not always be aware of its magnitude or implications. There has been present, at times, a disposition to scoff at philosophical considerations. This attitude arose with the two founders, Comte in Europe and Ward in America. Both were materialistic, positivistic, and hostile to philosophy of the older, *a priori* type. But in their supposed emancipation from metaphysical considerations, neither they nor their numerous followers perceived that they unconsciously adopted, in the same breath, a metaphysical position, namely, that of naïve, uncritical realism. They took matter and motion, space and time to be just what they seem to be. As for the profound epistemological problem which faces the fundamental question of how we mortals can know anything at all, their recognition, if it could be said to have existed, was extremely inadequate. American sociology, following this original, naturalistic, and later behavioristic, impulse has shown a disposition to imagine that it could become more “scientific” in proportion as it became less philosophical. Sometimes this error has produced a worse one in the corollary that mere ignorance of metaphysics is a good substitute for knowledge of science. By such reasoning two negatives are made to produce a positive, but recent advances in the field of science have made it even more plain that no so-called scientist is capable of talking intelligently about his field without some comprehension of the philosophical problems involved. Spykman puts this very effectively when he says that “according to Simmel, each exact science is flanked by two fields of philosophic inquiry, an epistemology and a metaphysics.”

he shows on later pages, the *epistemological* inquiry examines the basic, logical presuppositions of the particular science, sociology in the present instance. The *metaphysical* inquiry has two tasks. One is to round out the fragmentary evidence yielded by the achieved scientific knowledge of society into a more satisfyingly complete, even if partly speculative, picture. The other deals with the meaning, purpose, absolute substance, and religious significance of social life.\(^{18}\)

In other words, the competent sociological scholar will need to be intelligently aware of the bearing of philosophical considerations on both the logic and the values of his own field of study. This does not mean to say that he is to cease from science and turn philosopher, but he must be able to appreciate the place of his own more or less limited field in a larger view of life. This larger synthesis is the work of art, religion, and philosophy, and truly scientific sociological scholarship implies proper appreciation of them all. This includes the *ethical* life, and nothing is more needed than a system of social ethics that shall be grounded in personal and social reality. Far from disparaging the ethical motive, sociologists ought to be in position to contribute something to modern societies now suffering through the too sudden and sweeping abandonment of their long-standing mores.

The ethical motive is essential not only to sociology, but to all science. We need only the example of Ward, among competent thinkers in many fields, to remind us that it is indeed a flimsy and superficial idea that science, any more than art, is to be pursued for its own sake. The primary and essential enterprise of all living things is the effort to *control* life situations. Without this motive, probably

little science would exist, despite all that is said about intellectual curiosity. At bottom the reason for being of sociology is the desire to control social phenomena, the understanding of it being an afterthought and a means to the end.

In view of all these considerations I conclude that the true scholar in sociology will need to have historical perspective and a catholic spirit toward the works of his fore-runners and colleagues. He will need to cultivate the scientific temper and method, as our younger recruits are so valiantly and commendably insisting. But along with this scientific enthusiasm we need philosophical training and appreciation, the whole imbued with a profound regard for ethical considerations and the spirit of service, rooted in regard for the highest human values.

Thinkers everywhere are becoming conscious of the fact that modern man has evoked powers, through applied science, that human nature, as thus far developed, has neither the intellectual nor the moral capacity to use for human welfare on the whole. As Professor Flewelling effectively puts it, “If there is to be genuine well-being, knowledge and life must go hand in hand. Any assumption of hostility between knowledge and morals, between science and religion, is a vicious assumption which, from whatever side it is made, is hostile to life, to civilization, to science, and to religion.”

Sociology is indeed the study of social process, but that process involves the production of personality and of the highest human values as its very central theme. For this reason an amoral, non-ethical, strictly mechanistic sociology would be just about the most self-stultifying academic monstrosity one need hope to find. Life is essentially ac-

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tivity, and the characteristic form taken by life-activity at the human level is conscious, purposeful, and evaluative. Sociology is just now making a tremendous and commendable effort to become more exact in method, which is the whole significance of the recent stress on social research. But to cut loose from all the normative disciplines and abandon the hope of a larger synthesis in the process would be for sociology to sell her birthright for a mess of pottage. On the other hand, my picture of the scholar in sociology may seem, like the “very gentle perfect knight” of Chaucer, an unattained and unattainable ideal; but I do not think we can be harmed by holding it before us as a goal.
SOCIAL ECOLOGY OF A RIVER VALLEY

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The concentration of population in a fertile alluvial plain leads to exhaustion and loss of fertility of the soil in various ways. Even in the most fertile tracts deserts and barren lands appear, reacting most unfavorably upon both the economic condition and well being of the people. Both man’s ignorance and improvidence as well as natural causes check the aggregation of population beyond a certain stage. Thus the population tends to advance along the course of the rivers towards the more fertile region of softer alluvium.

Here, again, other dangers face man. When the distributaries that built deltas themselves silt up and lose their connection with the parent river, the delta becomes moribund. The country becomes gradually unfavorable to human habitation. The contrast between the active and the moribund delta is the contrast between hyper-activity and senile decay. In the Ganges delta, for instance, with the march of the main river eastward, the ancient distributaries in Western and Central Bengal no longer distribute silt-laden water, being confined into their channels by the high banks of silt which they have deposited. Thus the fertility of the soil, and agriculture have declined. The obstruction of drainage has produced unhealthful conditions and epidemics of fever have broken out, leading to depopulation and great shrinkages of cultivated area. Nearer the sea, however, there goes on a ceaseless process
of land formation. The rivers build up as they destroy, and man follows the constructive activity of the meandering distributaries as these push out new headlands into the sea. In the different stages of the rivers, the types of human settlement differ. Crops, occupations, density of population, and social organization all vary in the different parts of the river system. The whole texture of man's social and economic life is interwoven with that of the river-system.

Metchnikoff, the Russian geographer, has given us a clear analysis of river basin environments. The river basin, he holds, furnishes a synthesis or epitome of all the possible environmental variations and influences. The river, in every country, presents itself to us like a long synthesis of all the complex conditions of climate, soil, configuration, and geological constitution of the adjacent territory. Its course, slow or rapid, the volume and the speed of its waters, dependent on rains, snows, the alteration of the seasons, and innumerable other climatic variations; the relief of its basin, the greater or less extension of the seas into which it flows determining the length and the sinuosity of its course; the nature of its bed, the scarcity or the prodigality of its alluvial deposits, of its organic detritus, of the mineral substances that it holds in suspension, rendering its waters clear or turbid, taking from them these properties, colorations and varied taste, and augmenting or diminishing their plastic or destructive power.

We may extend his analysis further and apply it to the different parts of the river basin. In the higher reaches of the river, man was a hunter. His community was small and unstable. As the river comes down from the mountains, the pastoralist appears on the scene. The community increases in size but not in stability. In the level plain where agriculture is the chief source of food supply
the community becomes large and permanent. We find periodical fairs or markets in which forest products or woollen goods are sold at the junction of the valleys. Where the country roads or railroads meet, at the conjunctions of rivers or where rivers are easily forded, cities grow. Such cities collect food from the region, and distribute it in wider markets. The size of the city would depend upon the resources of the region and the facilities of distribution. The river stabilizes the human community through its aid to agriculture; as a highway it also keeps man always on the march.

As the river takes man through a fertile and populous plain towards the sea there is a change brought about in the size of the human community and the character of civilization. In the interior the city is a wholesale market town in the center of an agricultural region. At the mouth of the river, it becomes a port town which may be the distributing center for an entire continent. In the interior the size and character of an industrial town are governed by the supply of raw materials and the market organization of the particular industries located within the region. At the mouth of the river on account of the facilities of distribution the city becomes the seat of diversified and multiple industries and the emporium of world commerce.

The river in its different areas exhibits contrasts of resources and facilities of distribution. It is thus that the ecological process of the supply and distribution of resources governs both the size and character of the human community. Everywhere the density of population is adjusted to resources. On the mountains a hunting tribe gets a bare living on roots, herbs, fruits, and wild game. In the valley the shepherds and their flocks thrive as pastures become abundant. In the level plain, the density of population of the village community is governed by soil and the
supply of water. But as man develops and quickens transport, it is the facility of distribution rather than the local supply of resources which determines the size and structure of the human community.

The change in the ecological process produces contrasted types of social and economic life. To give but one or two instances, the conservative population and the stable village communities on the banks of the Jumna and the Ganges in the upper stages are in marked contrast with the floating settlements and itinerant habits of the people of Eastern Bengal. The contrast in types of city is as striking. Cawnpore is an important railway and manufacturing center in the Gangetic basin but it has specialized in one or two highly developed industries while the trade area it commands is local. Calcutta is the center of more diversified industries and as a port it accumulates goods from Eastern Bengal, Bengal, the United Provinces, the Punjab and Bombay Province and port, and also sends goods to the same areas (with the exception of Bombay).

Again, the upper parts of the river basin deteriorate while the lower parts exhibit constant growth and renewal. The changes in the fluvial environment which follow a perfect sequence produce characteristic rise and fall of the fluvial civilizations, which also present a remarkable regularity. It is thus that the life history of the great historic rivers reflects itself in the sequent development of cultures in the successive parts of the river basin. The geographical setting of civilization evolves with the passage of time: the stay-at-home culture of the valley gradually enlarging itself to become deltaic and then oceanic. It is also a change from archaic and stationary to progressive conditions. Throughout the march of civilization, along with that of the river from the interior to the sea, the resources of man have become richer and more complex. Man has also
learnt a greater mastery over his river environment. Formerly, the vicissitudes of man’s life depended upon the natural changes inevitable in the life of the river system. But as man gained a gradual mastery of the waters, he controlled and directed the rivers for his varied uses. Irrigation, river transport, flood agriculture, all bespeak man’s utilization of the waters. But by far the most significant development is trade by sea which ushers in an oceanic civilization superseding the fluvial. The resources of the latter are narrow and limited. The opportunities which the former affords extend as wide as the world.

For a time the thalassic or oceanic civilization neglects the environments man has emerged from. In the new world economy man neglects the arts of agriculture and brings about soil exhaustion. Because of soil depletion fluvial cultures have decayed. The civilizations of Egypt and Babylonia would not have existed but for the Nile and the Euphrates. But the fertile valleys, exhausted and laid bare, were unable to yield the crops necessary to maintain human life.

For commerce man cultivates fewer food crops and more raw materials for which the markets clamor. He adopts the plantation system, which by concentrating itself on one product or other brings about rapid deterioration of the soil as well as social unsettlement. Agriculture comes to be influenced rather by the state of the markets than by an arranged succession of crops which may replenish the soil. With the growth of industrial towns in the country itself there is a continual removal of crops and dairy produce, especially the latter, from the villages, and this impoverishes both soil and pasture. Gradually even the cereals as well as the cattle food grown on impoverished soils becomes deficient in nutritive constituents and this reacts upon the health of men as well as of farm animals in both village and city.
In timber camps and timber yards, again, men revel in bringing down the forests by fire and axe. In the commercial age, railways, harbors, roads, and all the machinery of transport are improved beyond recognition but water trade and transport are abandoned to neglect. Rivers and waterways are allowed to deteriorate till they become unfit for navigation. Thus the need of the regulation of the flow of the rivers, the cleaning of their channels, and the prevention of silting up are brought home to the merchant. It takes years of agricultural decline and rural unsettlement for man to realize that his reckless methods would redound to the discredit of his generation before future generations. He thus becomes more agriculturally inclined than ever before, and atones for past neglect. No longer is he concerned merely with the merchandise of commerce. For commerce and industry ultimately depend upon the agriculture, the arts, and the standard of living of the teeming millions. The oceanic civilization, in brief, cannot neglect the forest and the valley environments.

The interconnection and the interrelation between the different sections of the river basin with their typical stages of culture are now emphasized. Reforested plantations, verdant pastures, fertile fields, and world-wide markets all help one another. On the other hand, the story of agricultural decline is connected with deforestation in the heights, the neglect of pastures, the decline of water-supply or, again, the robbery of the soil by inefficient farming methods or by the succession of a money-crop governed by the needs of the world market irrespective of the needs of soil preservation. Man always and everywhere pays the penalty of disturbing the ecologic equilibrium. In an old and thickly peopled alluvial plain, where the adaptation of crops and farm practices to soil, climate, and water-supply is very close, the natural decline of rivers and soil
depletion and interference in the ecological complex brought about by human and cattle factors lead to the decline of ancient seats of civilization.

Scientific agriculture, afforestation, as well as judicious terracing and construction of embankments which protect riverine soil against erosion, the gradual cultivation of defensive vegetation in sand dunes and the reclamation of alkali lands by suitable cropping are some of man's recent efforts to use an alliance with the ecological forces for improvement of a difficult agricultural situation. Similarly, the study of hydrographical conditions in the different parts of the river basin gradually leads to a more scientific well and canal irrigation, the improvement of drainage, the regulation of rivers and minor streams, or the development of fisheries,—all of which react favorably upon social economy.

Man, tree, and water cannot be regarded as separate and independent. It is their interworking that is everywhere discernible on the topography of the land and on the life and manners of man. Man has learnt by trial and error that his life is inextricably interwoven with water, trees, and animals. If he commits crime against these, he lets loose destructive forces, which ultimately engulf his carefully wrought handiwork, his civilization. On the other hand, in the natural balance of man with the organic and inorganic world around him lies his security, well-being, and progress.
THE RELATION OF LYNCHING TO THE SIZE OF POLITICAL AREAS

A Note on the Sociology of Popular Justice

ERLE FISKE YOUNG

University of Southern California

It has been observed that the Southern counties with large populations are relatively freer from race violence than those with smaller populations. Statistical evidence of this observation can be obtained by correlating the data on lynching with the census population reports. Table I shows for fourteen states the “lynching rate” for populations living in the various sizes of counties. These rates show the approximate number of lynchings for each 100,000 persons; they are decennial rates. A glance down the columns for the different states reveals very few exceptions to the general rule that the larger the population of a county the lower the rate of lynching tends to become.

This phenomenon occurs seemingly whether the lynching rate be high or low when compared with that of other Southern states. The decennial rate for counties in Georgia with less than 10,000 population is 16.3 per 100,000 persons living in such counties. It drops to 3.4 for counties with populations from 10,000 to 20,000 and to 3.1 and 1.8 for the counties 20,000 to 30,000, and 30,000 to

1 The original data with considerable analysis can be found in Thirty Years of Lynching in the United States: 1889-1918. Annual supplements are available for each year since 1918. Published by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, New York City.

2 But not the number of victims of lynchings which would be a slightly higher number. Much higher rates and strict conformity to the inverse relationship above noted can be obtained by computing the rates on the basis of only those counties in which lynchings actually occurred during the given census period.
**TABLE I**

Approximate Number of Lynchings per 100,000 Population during Ten-Year Period for Certain Specified States Classified by Total Population of County of Occurrence at Census

Next Preceding Date of Lynching: 1889-1926

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POPULATION OF COUNTY AT PRECEDING CENSUS</th>
<th>ALABAMA</th>
<th>ARKANSAS</th>
<th>FLORIDA</th>
<th>GEORGIA</th>
<th>KENTUCKY</th>
<th>LOUISIANA</th>
<th>MISSISSIPPI</th>
<th>MISSOURI</th>
<th>NORTH CAROLINA</th>
<th>OKLAHOMA</th>
<th>SOUTH CAROLINA</th>
<th>TENNESSEE</th>
<th>TEXAS</th>
<th>VIRGINIA</th>
<th>RATE FOR ALL FOURTEEN STATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 10,000</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 to 20,000</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 to 30,000</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000 to 40,000</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,000 to 50,000</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
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<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000 to 100,000</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000 to 200,000</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200,000 to 300,000</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300,000 to 800,000</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Rates were not computed for separate states when less than 10 instances of this size of county were discovered in the state in the various census periods. These instances were included, however, in the computation of the rate for the entire group of states.
40,000, respectively, in size. Corresponding rates for Mississippi are 1.9, 0.6, 0.6, and 0.5.

It can be argued from such evidence as this that increasing the size of the political unit of local control would result in a more efficient administration of governmental functions at least so far as they have to do with race relations. In the case of the administration of justice, for example, the assumption is that the smaller units, because of the strength of local feelings and prejudices, are not able to deal with Negro crime impersonally and from the point of view of strict justice. In them, more frequently than in the larger units, government of laws tends to be replaced by government of men or, at least, of social classes. If the population were racially and culturally homogeneous and without wide discrepancies in the political or economic status of its members, the latter form of government would probably function wholly adequately.

Our system of local administration is a heritage from earlier and simpler times when racial and cultural homogeneity did to a considerable degree obtain. The local units of medieval times from which our county and town structure descends had developed to meet the needs of such groups. The conditions of the times determined in large measure their form and they were generally suited to their purpose. The physical and social isolation of the manor made local independence of action a necessity; homogeneity within the local unit made it feasible and workable. For generations the population was static. Local loyalties were intense. Local relations were further strengthened by the fact that customs, manners, traditions, interests, and even language, changed rapidly as one moved from locality to locality. Only after a prolonged struggle did the central government assert its authority in matters of common interest. Local matters, however, were still reserved for local control.
In modern times local communal conditions have almost completely changed. Isolation has been broken down in the course of the development of the capitalistic system. Communication is easy, rapid, and frequent. Populations are mobile. As a result the local community has lost a considerable share of its former significance. Yet old local institutions live on little altered in many respects. A form of political organization suited to the needs of a society organized into primary groups is now required to meet the demands of groups in which many secondary relationships occur.

It is therefore the smaller counties in which friction is most apt to occur, if we rely upon the statistical evidence. They are nearer in point of size to the primary group and in them the Negro as an unassimilated element in the population makes his presence most felt. So long as he was in slavery he was a recognized part of the primary group organization. As soon as he was freed he became an anomaly in the local community. There was no longer a place in the primary group for him. Only in some larger political order could he secure status apart from that he might have among his own people. Yet every step he made toward the attainment of a position in the larger social order was a direct challenge to the ascendancy of the older, smaller, more intimate communal organization. These smaller units, therefore, neither assimilate the Negro into the local organization nor are they prepared to deal with him on any other basis than that of primary relations.

If greater freedom from the ill effects of local prejudice can be secured by the use of larger areas of political control, why should not the state itself be made the arbiter of the more difficult problems of race relations? Of the nation? The proposal of a national anti-lynching law was, in fact, a move in this direction. What would be the results of reorganization along such lines?
We are not without precedent in this matter. There is a somewhat similar situation in English history. In late medieval times an intense struggle arose between the barons and the peasantry. In many respects the situation is comparable with that in the South at the present time. Nobles and villeins, like black and white in the South, were non-intermarrying groups. The barons were powerful and able to circumvent or openly defy at will the local authorities. Disorder frequently occurred and finally became intolerable. Local administration broke down and miscarriage of justice repeatedly occurred. The problems of an increasingly complex society were beyond the grasp of local jurymen and country justices.

To meet this situation the famous (later, notorious) "Star Chamber" was developed. This was a national institution with very wide powers. Among its various activities it dealt quite frequently with situations which were beyond the ability of local administration. No one could withstand its authority.

The Star Chamber, however, was independent of local sentiments for its sanctions. It was external to local communities and quite frequently in direct conflict with them. It is not unnatural, therefore, that it ultimately became very obnoxious in its practices and was at last formally abolished.

Inability to take account of local sentiments in some systematic and satisfactory way is characteristic of central-
ized administration. Local communities are well aware of this and are loath to give up their ancient prerogatives of self government. If they are compelled to surrender them and any serious violation of the local traditions occurs, the community will generally find ways and means to enforce its own will in the matter of dispute. It will disregard the law or defy it.

Alteration of the framework of local government is insufficient of itself to deal adequately with local relations unless the alteration reflects to some considerable degree the attitudes of persons in the community. When the law has its sanctions, not in the wills and consciences of the group but depends upon external forces, the enforcement of the law in the attempt to correct one abuse is apt to bring about other forms of disorganization.

No doubt some of the present difficulty lies in the persistence of outworn forms of political organization but fundamentally the problem appears to arise from the anomalous position of the Negro in the local communities of the South.

Further investigation of the problem is needed, of course, in order to establish the relation of such other factors, as the effect upon these rates when only the "black-belt" counties are included, the influence of density of population, of the proportion of Negroes in the county, of increase or decrease of the proportion of Negroes in the population, the relation of homicide rates to lynching rates and the effects of industrialization and urbanization. The interrelationships of these and other factors is a matter for study in the future. Statistical studies must necessarily be checked by social psychological studies of lynching episodes, of public opinion, and by historical inquiries so that the fundamental character of this phenomenon may be understood. The present study is necessarily a small part of a large enterprise.
Ancient philosophers like Democritus and Lucretius, by a strange vision prophesied that the ultimate components of matter were tiny atoms; that matter, therefore, is granular in structure. Modern science has transformed this dream into a reality, which is much more far-reaching than all the dreams of ancient philosophers, poets, and prophets. It tells us that not only is matter granular in structure, consisting of atoms and molecules; but that electricity is also granular, consisting of electrons and protons; that the structure of living organisms is granular, consisting of tiny cells and their microscopic components, the molecules of organic life. In other words, science teaches us that the visible universe is a macrocosm consisting of invisible granular microcosms.¹

In these words one of the greatest scientists of our time has voiced a fundamental truth not only of the physical world, but for the societary world as well. Each field of scientific investigation has a unit of study, a lowest common denominator to which its materials can be reduced, to which indeed they must be reduced if effective analysis is to proceed. The atom in chemistry, the molecule in physics, the cell in biology—these are the “granular” components of the respective structures studied by these sciences, to which Professor Pupin refers; they are the units to which their larger materials are reducible, and beyond which they cannot be reduced without changing their natures.

¹ From an address by Michael Pupin at the inauguration of William Mather Lewis as president of Lafayette College, October 20, 1927.
Sociology, concerned with the group life of mankind, is also dealing in terms of units, their arrangement and their activities. Obviously its lowest common denominator is the individual human being, that humano-bio-psychic entity known as man. He is the starting point and the focal point of all inquiry into societary phenomena. All groups are comprised of these individual human granules. Human society, or any of its parts, are combinations of human personalities, each one of which—like cell, molecule, or atom—should it be further reduced, would cease to exist as such.

But what is man as a granular particle of human society?

Every human being is first of all a biological organism. Each comes into the world in accordance with the familiar processes of reproduction as the eventual product of the union of ovum and spermatazoon. These contain the elements of his heredity; and their potentialities, present in the germ plasm from the first, within certain limits determine the potentialities of the offspring itself. From the moment of the union of the parental cells the new self is the center of a universe distinctly its own, and upon it from every quarter of the universe impinge influences which are incorporated into the sum total of what it eventually becomes. Some of these are from the world of nature, others are from the world of men. We may outline the familiar factors that go into his psycho-physical being as follows:

**ACCORDING TO SOURCE**

I Hereditary

The parental ovum and spermatazoon, united into a fertilized egg-cell, containing the germ plasm of biological ancestry, in which, from the moment of conception, the "inborn" traits and characters potentially exist. As such it is both inheritor and inheritance.
II Environmental

1. The Physico-environmental
   The entire world of nature, the physical universe, as differentiated from human society.
   a. Pre-natal
      The maternal body, operating through its foetal connections and tributaries and centering in the uterus.
   b. Post-natal
      The extra-uterine physical environment.

2. The Culturo-environmental
   The societary world, the realm of human association and influence, as distinguished from the world of nature.

ACCORDING TO METHOD OF IMPARTATION

I By Biological Inheritance
   Animal transmission via the germ plasm.

II By Bodily Acquirement
   Direct modification of the biological structure by changes induced during its individual life-time, as distinguished from the development of elements inherent in the germ plasm.
   1. Biochemically induced changes in the cellular tissues themselves, through nourishment, toxins, infections, etc.
   2. Mechanically induced changes which do not affect the chemical constitution of the cellular tissues: impacts, pressures, cuts, abrasions, etc.

III By Mental Reception
   Cultural transmission, effecting changes in mental states and attitudes, through influences upon the mind, but which involve no visible modification of the bodily structure.
   1. Direct
      By means of personal experiences and observations.
   2. Indirect
      By means of communication.

(Owing to the intimate, mysterious relation between mind and body, physical changes often induce mental changes, and vice versa; hence there can be no absolute separation of III from I and II.)
The relation between the methods of impartation of these factors and their sources will perhaps be more clear when charted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hereditary</th>
<th>Environmental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physico-Environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Present from the moment of conception, inherent in the germ plasm.</td>
<td>B Pre-natal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal transmission</td>
<td>Post-germinal structural changes, acquired while within the maternal body:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Biochemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Mechanical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-uterine changes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I By bodily acquisition—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Biochemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Mechanical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II By mental reception as a result of personal experiences with, or observation of, natural phenomena.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are three concepts under which it is especially appropriate to consider the self in this connection. The first of these is man as Biohom: the Biological Self. The second is man as Socius: the Societary or Human Self. The third is man as Person: the Situation Self. It is of
fundamental importance for sociological analysis to differentiate these three. The first two shall each be dismissed briefly in order to give more attention to the third.

THE CONCEPT OF THE BIOHOM: THE BIOLOGICAL SELF

In the absence of a better term, which is badly needed, by which to distinguish the biological self from the others, we may coin the term Biohom (i.e., biological homo, as contrasted with cultural homo). He is the sum total of everything that goes into the physical and mental make-up of man, with the exception of those elements which come from his societary environment. Using the letters of the chart we may say, in algebraic formula, that

\[\text{The Biohom} = A + B + C\]

In Professor Park’s phrase, “Man is not born human,” and without contact with fellow men would not be human at all, but merely animal.

THE CONCEPT OF THE SOCIUS: THE SOCIETARY OR HUMAN SELF

The “humanness” of man begins at the point of human association. From the moment of birth societary influences are at work upon him, modifying and adding to his original equipment. From his experiences with his fellow men each biohom builds up an accretion of elements that transforms him into a social being. Some of these come down from the past in such forms as language, tradition, history, laws, and institutions which are passed on from generation to generation. Some are fairly contemporary, arising from the daily life of himself and his fellows. Some of them are technique, consisting of the tools and implements and inventions and special adaptations of the ele-
ments of his material world. Some are intangible, such as his beliefs and attitudes. He is in truth an heir of all the ages, having access to a social heritage that leads back to the first sharp-edged tool that may have been used to assist the horny claws of a remote ancestor, and to that ancestor's first onomatopoetic word.

Whatever he acquires of this social heritage plus that which he acquires from his contemporaries makes of him a human creature, to which Giddings has given the name *socius*, which we may define as the biohom plus the sum total of his social accretions. In terms of the diagram

\[
\text{The Biohom} = A + B + C; \quad \text{but} \\
\text{The Socius} = A + B + C + D
\]

It has for a long time been customary to regard the socius as the societary unit. In one way it is quite proper that he should be so regarded; for only the socius really constitutes the whole man. Any other view of him is fragmentary and partial, we have no other concept by which to designate the entire physical-mental-social *anthropos*. But by a paradox it is this very completeness which makes the term unusable in the most important sociological connections. We must divide this "complete" self, which has been built up through years of laborious social accumulation, into constituent parts, each of which constitutes a "self" of another sort: the Person.

THE CONCEPT OF THE PERSON: THE SITUATION SELF

"There are two natures struggling within me," runs the inscription on the base of Rodin's great statue of primitive men. The parable of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, with its better and baser selves contending with one another for the mastery, is a dream reenacted daily within each human life. And further self-examination convinces us that we
are not only two selves, but that we are many, as many in fact as there are groups or situations calling upon us. No socius can possibly manifest all of himself at a given time; he can at best manifest only certain phases of himself which are drawn out by the particular situation in which he is at the moment.

Let any one follow thoughtfully through his cycle of experiences of a single day. At breakfast in the bosom of the family, certain parts of the self are brought into play which are subordinated or lost sight of entirely during separation from the other members of the household. Entering the university campus we become a different self as we encounter our university associates. We even change personalities from class room to class room as each draws upon certain aspects and knowledge of the socius. The mathematics class at 8:30, the French class at 9:30, the sociology class at 11:30, and the gym class in the afternoon: in each we exhibit a different self. At noon we sit at lunch with fellow members of a fraternity or other campus organization; we attend the basketball game at night, and go to an after-game supperette with members of the team following. Arriving at last at the privacy of our own room at 11:30 with the rest of the world shut out for the first time since we arose, we spend a frantic hour or two in solitude, struggling with tomorrow’s assignments.

Each one of these situations has called upon certain elements of the self and from them created a combination of attitudes which are characteristic of it alone, and out of the range of every other combination. Like the thousand-handed deity of the Hindus, the socius has, figuratively speaking, a hand representing each phase of his societary self, a point of contact with some present or past experience. But, like that same deity, he cannot grasp anything with all his hands at once. While he may use each of these
in several situations, no two situations call for the same combination. Like the kaleidoscope which at each turn of the cylinder presents a new pattern, though it uses the same materials over and over, so the self presents in each situation a diagram which is different from every other diagram.

Park and Burgess have made distinct advance upon Professor Giddings' conception of the socius by making clear that the person plays a different rôle in each group of which he is a part. They give the name “person” to that group self as indicative of the unique rôle played by the self in its particular group. Should we not carry that idea still further and remind ourselves that it is not merely in separate groups that separate rôles are played, but that there are many situations as well of which this is true. In the isolation of one's study, in the apartness felt as a stranger in an unfamiliar city, in the poetic solitude of moonlight reverie upon a hill top, one is in truth playing a rôle although it is not a rôle within any group.

Upon this point there can easily be difference of opinion, for there are many who maintain that there is no situation which is not a group situation. They may argue that the lonely lover, in fond reverie, in reality is a part of a group of two, himself and the longed-for maiden; that the Hermit of Engedi finds his spiritual exaltation composed in great measure of his conscious apartment from other men; that very consciousness-of-apartness making him in a special way a very vital part of them. This point of view does not seem a satisfactory one to me. It is, of course, beyond question that when one is alone in the depths of the wilderness, he is, even there, inseparable from his cultural memories and associations of the past. His manner of life depends upon knowledge previously acquired, his feelings toward other men make him look forward to a return to civilization or else repel him from it. No one will
take issue with this fundamental truth wrapped up in the gentle humor of Professor Cooley's comment that "we may suspect that St. Simon Stylites, who dwelt for years on top of a pillar, was not unaware that his austerity was visible to others." But to say that there is no situation in which one is not a part of some group is to say in effect that even the group-person does not exist, since one inevitably carries into every group something of what he is by reason of contact with every other group. It is more logical to recognize that to the extent to which a person shuts off all his other group selves when he enters Group A (recognizing that this can only relatively be done), to the same extent he may enter into many situations where he can and does relatively shut off his Group A self as well. When he does this he is as remote from Group A as he is from all other groups. The term Situation-self seems, therefore, a more desirable term than Group-self, since it is broad enough to cover those occasions when he is outside of all groups, as well as those where he is an active group participant.

Let us, then, think of the Socius as comprised of a multiplicity of selves, as numerous and as various as are the situations which arise. In certain of these situations he is in positive interaction with others; in these he is a group-self. In others he does not share a moment's experience with any one, but is wholly outside of interaction, so may be thought of as alone. In either case, whether inside or outside of the group, he is a situation-self; and he it is that is meant by the term person, when it is accurately used. It is this situation-self that constitutes the lowest common denominator when we undertake sociological analysis of any group. The true unit of any group is not the socius, which can never appear in his entirety at any one time; nor the psycho-physical biohom, that individual which is the
CONCEPT OF THE PERSON

self stripped of his social accretions. The person is the ultimate granule of the human group, and for this reason it is he that constitutes the true societary unit.

One of the most curious and significant things about the person is the way in which it becomes so identified with its situation or group of persons that it seems to reflect them. One sitting down to an evening of writing letters to a number of people will experience a transition in himself from one of his persons to another as he establishes the imaginary contact essential to correspondence. To an old fashioned and somewhat dignified aunt there will be a tone of formalism and dignity in spite of oneself. Toward a former highly revered and beloved teacher there may creep in a tone of the same deference that as a student was felt in his presence. Toward a bosom pal there will be an outrush of unrestricted and unselfconscious expression that bespeaks the utter self abandonment felt in his actual presence. Being “all things to all people,” as the apostle phrased it, is the very nature of the person himself. The reverential and religious attitude taken at the Sunday morning church service, if it be genuine and not feigned, is just as genuine as an opposite attitude taken when in a group of boon companions on a Saturday night “stag.” One may say of himself in reference to several groups in which he has been present, that he has been more of “himself” in one, and less so in another. In the presence of one acquaintance he may be perfectly at home, in another’s “I was not myself at all.”

How may these several selves be reconciled? Especially so when one is found to be the very antithesis of the other? When Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde struggle within me for the upper hand, am “I” Dr. Jekyll or Mr. Hyde? The answer is, I am all the selves which genuinely express themselves through my personality. Both Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde are me, and so are all the other selves that belong to the
various situations that arise. I am each of them in turn. When I say I am not myself today, I only mean that I am not my customary self; for even this undesirable person which bad weather, or unfortuitous circumstances has brought to light is a phase of the socius.

The word person is derived from the Latin *persona*, the name of the mask worn by performers upon the stage. The implication of this etymology would be that each *person* as defined above, is but a mask for the true self behind the mask. Our conclusion, however, is exactly opposite to this. No true person that the socius may present in any situation is a mask. Each one is a veritable and bona fide self, even when in diametric opposition to some other self. Each is partial, and incomplete, and may fail to show a single trace of some other and more important self, but each is authentic within its context and situation.

Not only is each one’s persons authentic for that situation, it is also relatively constant to it. That is to say, the *self* of the Sunday morning service never by any chance becomes transposed with the self of the Saturday night “stag.” The self which attends the 8:30 class in mathematics does not interchange with the self of the 9:30 French class. Within each there will be varying moods and attitudes, but they are varying moods and attitudes of the same person. The reason for this is not far to seek. It grows out of the fact that each group, by its very nature, provides a characteristic stimulus which is fairly constant, which produces a like response from time to time. This in time becomes habitual. Furthermore, the tendency is for each member of the group to acquire the same characteristics of attitude and behavior, and since, to paraphrase the geometric axiom, things resembling the same thing resemble each other, there is gradually evolved a homogeneity among the members of the group, that colors and unifies and intensifies the whole group character.
ADULT EDUCATION is one of man’s efforts to establish his own freedom. In a recent article H. G. Wells discusses the absurdity of much of the criticism of our own generation in comparison with a glorified past. The life of the average man today freed from the domination of his physical needs affords far greater opportunity for self development than in any previous age. The elimination of plagues, the establishment of comfortable living standards for the great masses of the people, the shortening of the working period, all contribute to ease of life such as has never been known except in the most privileged classes, and comforts of the working man today far exceed those of the kings and queens of a few centuries ago.

Man has done much in modifying his environment that has brought him a high degree of emancipation in the physical world. He is rapidly conquering the material universe. He has been much less successful in developing and changing himself than in modifying his environment. Spiritual freedom has not kept pace with freedom in the world of things. Man has developed science until he has the ability to build a skyscraper and then he dare not number the thirteenth floor because people are too superstitious to live on it. Adult education is one of the ways by which we are attempting to gain spiritual freedom. A Greek philosopher has divided man’s activities into three parts, viz., work, which is something he does, not for its own sake—
such as earning money, passing examinations, obtaining credits; play, something which he does to recover from work,—relaxation of mind and body; and, lastly, leisure, which is the noblest thing in life,—effort made for its own sake, such as climbing a high mountain, writing a poem, listening to great music, time spent in contemplative thought. Leisure is work that is desirable for itself; it gives the significance to life. A distressing observation of our own world today is that it leaves almost no place for leisure in this sense. We have learned to work and play frantically, but there is less and less real leisure. Adult education is one effort to provide such leisure in man's life.

In planning California's public school program of adult education, we have had some difficulty explaining what we mean by adult education. The very term "education" has been so misused and overused that it is generally misunderstood. We educate people to use breakfast foods and gas ranges and radio devices; to believe in votes for women, America first, and a bigger navy, and the like. None of these is education. When an advertiser says he is educating the public to use his gas stove,—he means he is trying to close the mind of his readers to all other types of gas stoves. This is precisely what education is not. If he were educating the public about gas stoves, he might tell the good and bad points in all available stoves and leave the buyer to form a judgment. And so adult education is not a method of alluring people to think in a certain way. It is not a credo; nor is it education to enable man to earn a livelihood. Adult education in the definition we are using has nothing to do with that first phase of man's endeavor, namely, work. Nor is it education for play—it is education for that third thing in man's life which we call leisure. If you visit almost any evening high school in the United States, you will discover that ninety-eight per cent
of the people are there to learn how to do something in order to increase their earning capacity,—mechanical drawing, typing, dressmaking, auto mechanics, and the like. Very few classes are organized because the subject has value in itself. If we remove the motive of earning more money, we would almost close our evening high schools. However, the last year in California has seen a marked change in this situation. Vocational education began its important work at about the same time that our evening schools were developing. Vocational education soon cut itself free from the traditions which bound liberal education and still binds it. As a consequence, adults whose educational efforts were voluntary naturally chose those courses which were most adapted to their needs, and these were the vocational courses. When a principal was looking for a man to teach a class in electricity in an evening high school, he found someone who had succeeded in that field on the outside. When he gave a course in history, instead of getting a brilliant historian, he frequently took someone who had not succeeded in getting a day school position.

In our program of adult education in California, we have set as our goal that we shall present the liberal subjects with the same appeal to human needs and taught with the same freshness of approach and by teachers of equal skill as we have found in the vocational subjects. We are determined to recognize that the public school has a function which is just as important as teaching a man to earn a living. It must help him to find for those increasing hours when he is no longer at work a capacity to enjoy leisure in the classical sense.

The adult education program of the public schools should, therefore, in addition to its vocational work, serve three great purposes. In the first place, it should offer
opportunity for training in deliberative and critical thinking. As we survey the education we give students from the kindergarten to the university, there is much to question in its achievement of this purpose. Too much is done to compel students to think as the professor does or as the book does, rather than to form their own judgments. There is a backward look to all of our education in the formal school sense. The need for a democracy is a look at the future. There are many examples of the way in which we do not apply critical thinking in our political life. Mayor Thompson of Chicago was elected on the slogan that he would keep the King of England out of Chicago politics. Chicago was faced by many major political issues some of which would cause the people to do deliberative thinking. Of course, there were other factors in that election, but the important thing that the political adherents of Thompson realized was that they must find some way to appeal to the prejudices of everybody and to shut people's minds. One of the chief phases of adult education is to re-educate people's minds which have been closed by the type of education used in our schools.

Another purpose which adult education serves is in giving an equality of opportunity in sharing the cultural heritage of the past and in bringing men and women of all walks of life in contact with the greatest thought of all the ages. We are in danger of losing our own past. The old political systems which limited privilege to a few, gave those few all the fine things of life,—music, art, literature. This gave to learning a greater value and the sacred torch was passed from hand to hand, generation to generation. Our educational opportunities are open to everybody. There is no elect class entrusted with conserving our inherited riches. We are, therefore, running the risk of losing all our interest in and appreciation of the values of our
inheritance. Adult education has to bring back a renaissance of the joy of learning to take the place of the compulsion of the present day.

Adult education has a third purpose which is its own special sphere. There are certain things we learn better in adult life than in youth. Maturity and wisdom are the results of experience. The most we can hope for youth is that they may get the tools which will make it possible for them to continue their education. Without these tools, it is difficult to pursue knowledge. It may be necessary to obtain those tools after adult life, but this is not adult education. It is not a means of making up for the defects in early education. It should come after we have some understanding of the universe and its meaning; to give us more abundant life.

The practice of citizenship is an adult need. To youth it can only be a theoretical proposition in government. To a grownup, it should be the way in which he determines his social environment. Man must learn to live happily and intelligently with his fellows. The business of nation building is required of adults and yet has been given almost no consideration at all. As Americans, we are not looking forward to the future and recognizing that we, the people, have the power to determine the nation we shall be. For instance, a selective immigration policy which would not be an affront to the nations from which our immigrants come instead of the mechanical device we are now using, might be an outgrowth of a fine adult education program. In adopting our present immigration legislation, we were entirely unaware that we were attacking one of the most fundamental institutions—the home. It is estimated that there are one hundred and sixty-five thousand women and children and aged parents whose wives and fathers and sons are in America and there is no method by which these broken families may be united under our present quota law.
This is just one example of the way in which we fail to apply scientific methods to our social and political life. Mexican immigration is particularly interesting from this standpoint. Mexico offers a ready opportunity for the application of scientific methods to nation building. Communication is easy, distances are relatively short and there is no conflict between the attitude of the two nations on the question of migration. Mexico would be quite willing to keep her nationals at home if restriction were not based upon an assumption of superiority on our part. Therefore, some sort of flexible arrangement could be arrived at in which both nations would co-operate, so that economic necessity and the need for labor supply would govern the number of Mexicans admitted. This would prevent using Mexicans to lower wage standards as well as forcing them as a charge upon the relief agencies of the city when the particular work season is over. The National Council for Social Research is undertaking a nation-wide study of casual labor needs in this country and of Mexican immigration, which could serve as a basis for our national policy.

In all phases of our national, as well as our local politics, there is need for the use of engineering statecraft in the place of the blundering trial and error method. This can never come about in a democracy while the people remain in all essentials uneducated even though every one has learned to read and write. The requisite education can be best obtained in adult life. This is equally true in education for parenthood, and education in some of the more important aspects of home building; education which would help us to solve some of the more serious problems in our social institutions. If the criticism of the education in our schools and colleges has been that it looks backward, it is exceedingly important that adult education look upward and forward, for it concerns itself with everything that gives meaning and significance to life.
In its immigration legislation the United States has made special exceptions relative to migration from both Mexico and Canada. When the recent immigration law of 1924 was passed, Europeans were given specific quotas, the Japanese and other Orientals were not given any quota, while Canadians and Mexicans, and other Central and South Americans were allowed unlimited quotas. In other words, no numerical or percentage restrictions were placed on people coming from Mexico, providing of course, such immigrants were born in that country and met the other standards of admission. Special privileges thus were accorded immigrants from Mexico, partly because of the need for unskilled labor from Mexico.

Within the last few years, in fact, since the World War began in 1914, Mexican immigration has attracted attention to itself, partly because of the actual increase in Mexican immigrants and partly because the decline in European immigration made the increased Mexican immigration stand out conspicuously. This prominence has raised the question whether Mexicans should not be placed on the quota. It has been stated that Mexicans as Latin peoples are more obviously related to South Europeans than to the people of the United States and that since the South Europeans are put on the quota the Mexicans should be placed there also. Immigration restrictionists thus are the first group to urge the quota for Mexicans. They point...
out that annually fifty thousand Mexicans more or less, are officially coming to the United States, not to mention the others that cross the border illegally, while only a few thousand from each of a number of the North European countries are admitted each year. W. W. Husband, who has long been an immigration official at Washington, D. C., recently said that when we hold back thousands of desirable immigrants from northern Europe, but leave the door open to Mexico, there arises a wholly unwarranted situation.

A second group to advocate putting Mexicans on the quota is organized labor. Their argument is that large numbers of unskilled Mexican immigrants keep American standards down, and that the unionist movement is hindered. "Low wages, long hours, low standards of living on the part of Mexicans," means, said a labor leader at the October, 1927, meeting of the American Federation of Labor, that "the Mexicans are wresting the Southwest from Americans." Another speaker asserted that "the worst curse on American labor today is the influx of Mexican labor." A resolution urging that Congress put the Mexicans on the quota was sidetracked by the American Federation at the October meeting in order to give the Mexican Federation of Labor a chance to secure legislation in Mexico that would discourage emigration to the United States, and thus make unnecessary quota legislation in our country against Mexicans.

A third group which urges the quota for Mexicans is composed of social and public health workers. Despite the fact that these people are special friends, often personal friends of the Mexicans, they favor quota legislation. They do not want more Mexicans to come until those who are here are better able to take care of themselves than they are now. They point out that in a metropolitan area such
as Los Angeles the Mexicans constitute 7 or 8 per cent of the total population, but 28 to 30 per cent of the charity cases supported by the county and from public taxes; that the Mexicans run as high as 40 per cent of the cases cared for at the Los Angeles General Hospital; that Mexicans in the Los Angeles County Jail run far above their population rate; and that the danger of contagious diseases originating in and spreading from unsanitary Mexican quarters to the better-class American districts is great. Even the higher-class Mexicans dread the arrival of Mexican transients, and realize that the latter may bring sickness and disease to well people in this country. Between seasonal demands for labor, Mexicans drift to the large cities and unemployment mounts high. When those who have been here six months or longer ask for higher wages, they are met with the rejoinder that newcomers from Mexico can be secured at the old wages. Moreover, some Mexican immigrants are beginning to feel that they are mistreated in this country, and are organizing to assert their rights. Clashes between Mexican immigrants and other immigrants or between Mexicans and Americans are occasionally reported in the daily press. A Texas observer sums up the situation this way: “For the sake of speeding up the utilization of our natural resources, we are creating for ourselves a social problem, full of dismal prospects, of race hatreds, of bruised feelings, of social ostracisms, and perhaps of lynchings” and race wars. While these problems are developing, increasing millions of the taxpayers’ money are required to pay the charity, the jail, and the public health bills of the lower-class Mexican immigrants. In all these social welfare reports, however, the abnormal conditions caused by the Mexican are not charged by the students of the problem to the Mexican’s heredity, but to his lack of educational and industrial training.
In the fourth place, public school teachers who are engaged in teaching both Mexican children and Mexican adults constitute in the main the most loyal friends the Mexicans have in our country. They understand the Mexicans well, and are excellent spokesmen for the Mexicans' needs. What is their verdict? They favor the quota on the ground that under present conditions we are not adequately providing for our Mexicans. As special friends of Mexicans they do not want large numbers coming in when those already here are living far below American standards. They point to the migration of Mexicans from one seasonal industry to another, and to the great difficulties in providing schooling for the children and decent living conditions for all, under migratory conditions.

Fifth, Mexican leaders in the Southwest advocate the quota for Mexican immigrants. A regulated number for each year will enable Mexican leaders to develop protective and self-help organizations among the lower-class immigrants, who are now, it is claimed, being exploited. Large influxes of peons prevent the leaders here from developing an esprit de corps among the masses.

We now turn to a consideration of the data and the people who oppose the quota. In the main, these are large-scale employers of labor in the Southwest. The railroads, the lumber and mining industries, and the operators of large ranches and farms in Texas, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, and California, depend largely on Mexican labor for their construction and maintenance work. The Mexican, it is declared, is doing almost every type of constructive and unskilled factory work, as well as maintaining our railroads and large sections of our highways, and raising a large amount of foodstuffs. "It is he who picks the cotton in Texas and Arizona"; tends the vineyards, the citrus orchards, the walnut groves, and the melon fields
of California, gathers the sugar beets in Colorado and California, does much of the surface work at the copper mines of Arizona and New Mexico, and not a little of the mining and furnace labor elsewhere. "Throughout the Southwest he is the principal highway builder and the exclusive railroad section hand."

To put the Mexicans on the quota would cut their official annual immigration from fifty thousand more or less, to fifteen hundred, but what would happen to the large-scale industries now employing Mexicans? At present European farm labor is not available to the Southwest because our restrictive legislation has bottled up the sources. Japanese and other Oriental labor are debarred from entering the country by legislative action requested by the West. The Japanese laborer was unusually efficient, and now that his place is becoming vacant, it takes two ordinary laborers to take his place. The suggestion that employers bring in shiploads of Chinese coolie labor for six months, return them, and bring in other shiploads is contrary to American principles of freedom. Native American youth are refusing to do rural manual labor. They are hurrying to the cities, caught by the glamor of white collar jobs, and the larger opportunities to get ahead.

The major remaining possibilities in sight for large-scale Western agriculturists are declared to be, first, improved machinery, which is very expensive, and some of which is not yet invented; second, Mexican labor; and third, farm abandonment. A friend of mine in Imperial Valley states that if the Mexicans are put on the quota, the Valley as an agricultural region will revert to a desert. The manager of a Colorado company when asked what he would do without Mexicans replied: "We'd be out of luck. We'd have to close our factories, and the farmers would lose their crops. We are absolutely dependent on the Mexi-
cans.” From Phoenix, Arizona, comes the statement: “If a sufficient supply of suitable labor, that is, Mexican, cannot be obtained, thousands of acres under government reclamation projects throughout the West, will be forced to quit intensified farming and raise crops that can be produced and harvested with a small amount of labor.” Ten weeks ago, the Board of Directors of the California Fruit Growers Exchange, representing eleven thousand citrus growers and investments of about three hundred millions of dollars vigorously protested the quota for Mexicans, asserting that the citrus growers of this state are almost entirely dependent upon Mexican labor, that to restrict the labor supply will curtail crops and cause an advancement of food prices. Moreover, it is claimed that the climatic conditions which prevail in the citrus belt are such that only the Mexicans are physically constituted to perform the work required.

Another group of people who oppose the quota for Mexicans contend that it would be an affront to Mexico to put her on the quota. Thus far no North or South American country is on the quota, but to single Mexico out and apply the quota to her would create ill will in our sister republic. The other alternative would be to put Canada and South American countries on the quota, but this is deemed unnecessary and undesirable.

A third group who object to the quota are those who argue that the eighteen hundred miles of border between Mexico and the United States could not be adequately policed. The pressure to bring Mexicans across would be so great and smuggling them in would become so profitable that a quota law for Mexicans would become a joke.

A fourth objection to the quota is raised by people who believe that the problem will settle itself if it is left alone. They claim that as conditions improve in Mexico, immi-
Migration to this country will decrease and that many Mexican immigrants will want to return to Mexico. Thus, the Mexican immigrant problem will be solved.

Now that the two sides of this question have been presented, what is the solution? Some compromises that have been proposed are: (1) It is suggested that the Mexicans be put on the quota, but that exceptions be made so that they could be brought in under contract for six months and returned. In this way they would not become a charge upon the taxpayer, and yet our labor needs could be met. But contract labor of this sort is peonage, which is a condition only once removed from short-term slavery. It is repugnant to democracy.

(2) Some favor the quota law, but advocate that it should not be put into effect for two years, thus giving American employers a chance to make adjustments. But the nature of these adjustments is by no means clear. Moreover, in the two-year interim, many thousands of Mexicans could be rushed into this country, and special problems created.

(3) A recent suggestion has been made by Senator Watson of Indiana that a special ten per cent quota be created for Mexicans, Canadians, and South Americans and that provisions be made for bringing in additional Mexicans for six months at a time. This is obviously a makeshift plan.

(4) A fourth suggestion comes from those who urge that Porto Rican Negroes be imported to do the necessary unskilled agricultural work. This procedure would create a new race problem of extreme gravity.

(5) Another suggestion calls for an industrial and housing survey of the Southwest under Federal auspices, whereby the actual employment needs could be ascertained, and whereby the amount of unemployment month by month could be learned. As a result of this double-headed sur-
vey, plans could be worked out for adjusting employment needs to employees month by month, industry by industry, and locality by locality. This survey could determine whether we already have sufficient Mexican immigrants here now, and whether the real problem could be solved by improving both the living conditions and the working conditions of these Mexicans.

(6) It is advocated that both sides to this controversy send an equal number of representatives to a conference to try to work out an equitable solution, and thus to present to Congress a plan that is developed after fair discussion by persons willing to look beyond the particular interests which they represent. It is claimed that such a plan would be a distinct improvement upon the hit-or-miss procedure in which both sides are inaugurating propaganda and engaging in partisan debate. But such a conference, on the other hand, might easily become deadlocked and accomplish little.

(7) It is also proposed that the question be taken up by the governments concerned, and that an impartial and broad-minded joint commission be appointed to study the whole problem and to work out a solution acceptable to both countries. This proposal is sound in theory, but involves serious obstacles that constitute a challenge to American and Mexican intelligence, good will, and courage.
The thirty-six hundred and seventy-nine pages of this work constitute by no means its only claim to be called monumental. The vast majority of them are packed with facts, framed in the smallest imaginable, indeed quite incredible, amount of theory. These facts are about societal things, mostly in primitive groups, and their collection, systematic arrangement, and interpretation represents the toilsome labor of the authors over a very long period. As the Preface declares, "it has been in the writing for some twenty-seven years."

The story of its production, like the book itself, is of unusual interest. William Graham Sumner began it in 1899, but later turned aside to write his now well-known *Folkways*. For six or seven years he worked along at it, and then suffered the breakdown which ended his life in 1910. He insisted that Keller, his pupil and colleague, should accept his vast collection of notes and build them into a work of his own. This being steadfastly rejected, it was finally agreed that Professor Keller should complete the work as the joint product of the two men. All this, most interestingly told in the Preface, finally eventuated in this huge work. It is printed in four solid volumes, at the Yale University Press, through the loyal assistance of the Sumner Club. It rests in part financially upon the McMillan Memorial Foundation at the university where Sumner long ago reached the magnitude of a tradition. Professor Keller's generous and loyal devotion to his acknowledged master, while at the same time preserving his own integrity and force, is quite remarkable. The skill with which he has brought the long project to completion makes one almost feel that "the senior author" is still at Yale and actually speaking in the pronoun "we," through which the utterances of this unprecedented joint authorship are uniformly delivered.

It would hardly do to assume that this work is meant to pass as a "sociology," since it is called a "science of society," and its vast materials are overwhelmingly anthropological and ethnographical. The authors deliberately draw the bulk of their evidence "from the
life of prehistoric societies, including under that term the contemporary societies of primitive men who have no history in the strict sense.” (Vol. III, p. 2183.) Moreover, they do not attempt to reconstruct the remote past even upon this evidence. Following the true Sumnerian tradition, their point of view is extremely conservative in several ways. Even in the matter of social origins and social evolution, concerning which their four volumes present what is perhaps the greatest body of systematically arranged materials in existence, they refuse to attempt a drawing of the entire curve. At both ends they leave it un plotted. That is to say, they refrain from trying to picture remote prehistoric social antecedents on the one hand or to carry forward their account of simpler society into the interpretation of the complex, highly civilized societies of modern times. The latter they regard as a possibility when the science of society has advanced to the necessary level, but refrain from the slightest attempt for the present.

Another expression of the conservatism mentioned is a horror of utopian or speculative theorizing in every form and degree. These attitudes will be instantly recognized as characteristic of Sumner, and they represent only one of the many ways in which his very distinctive outlook is embodied in this work. For instance, dominating ideas throughout the entire four volumes are the central significance in all societal life of the folkways and mores; the basic importance of the “man-land ratio; hunger, love, vanity, and fear as the four “human motives”; the part played by the aleatory or luck element and ghost-fear; and throughout all a tremendously objective social realism. All these will be recognized as distinctly redolent of what long ago became known as “Sumnerology” at Yale.

One other attitude, even more distinctive of Sumner, was deliberately omitted from the above, because one of the most interesting aspects of this work is the modification it makes in the application of laissez-faire. This, as is well known, represents one of the most pronounced of all Sumner’s very pronounced ideas and attitudes. The average lay reader, even the sociology student, has come to understand that Sumner out-Spencered Spencer in his abhorrence of any and all attempts to interfere with the natural course of societal evolution. Yet in Section 461 of Volume III, the junior author has made a presentation of the matter that strikes one as a decided softening down, if not an essentially different formulation of Sumner’s thought. Perhaps it represents a more correct and discriminating statement of the deceased senior author’s real view by one who intimately
understood his thought and purpose; or perhaps it is really the junior author speaking for himself and also for the senior author as he might be expected to speak, in answer to criticism, if able to speak today.

At any rate we read that "all that laissez-faire ever meant in practice is what the sign 'Hands Off' upon swiftly running and delicate machinery means. . . . In their natural irritation with meddlers, men like Spencer may have called for an exaggeration of the let-alone policy." (Vol. III, p. 2223.) Then, as if to cut loose finally from the accepted view of Sumner as the American apostle of non-interference, the author goes on to say, "Laissez-faire should be set aside as representing nothing but a figure of straw that has been much and ferociously knocked about." The conclusion is: "There is no need or desire, therefore, for any dogmatic assertion that interferences are not and never can be wise and beneficial. We can then, under the same conditions which we seek in determining similar questions in other fields, consider what interferences to attempt." (Ibid., p. 2222.)

The first three volumes set forth the systematic account of societal evolution, arranged with great logical lucidity, while the fourth volume devotes its 1331 pages of fine print to illustrative materials, referred to by cross-references in the other volumes. This fourth volume is called the "Case-Book," and it is a really monumental store-house of materials about primitive society, gathered from an astoundingly wide and authoritative range of sources. The entire work constitutes a product worthy of the very high scholarship of both the authors, who are assisted in the Case-Book by Professor Maurice Rea Davie, of the same department.

In two respects, at least, this notable work is further remarkable for its omissions. Throughout the unprecedented stretch of its pages there is scarcely a reference to any other American sociologist, and then only in an almost incidental way. Moreover, the reader will look in vain for any utilization, except in the popular sense, where at all, of a majority of the concepts that are most prominent, perhaps most suggestive and fruitful, in current sociology, either in Europe or America; for example, such terms as wishes (although Sumner's "four motives" are equivalent), attitudes, values, processes, personality, personality-types, life-histories, etc. For the work under review, contemporary sociology, and much of most suggestive (theoretical) ethnology does not exist.

But in justice to the authors it should be said that they cast no aspersions, and apparently intend no disparagement of these things.
They simply regard theoretical and speculative studies about human society, either primitive or modern, as falling outside the range of the science of society, as thus far advanced. They choose to limit the scope and undertakings of the subject rather than abandon in the least their effort to be utterly objective and inductive in method, and scientifically reserved in inferences and conclusions. (Cf. Vol. III, p. 463.)

The volumes are written in a notably clear, simple, and easy style, and the whole vast array of materials is marshalled under the appropriate categories in a masterly way. The grand divisions of the work are: I. Self-Maintenance; II. Self-Perpetuation; III. Self-Gratification; all these processes being considered in their societal, rather than their individual, aspects.

C. M. C.


This is an attempt to show the development of human traits from man's prehistoric ancestors down to their present emergence in our social organization. The author ingeniously takes the method of presenting the development by stressing the evolution of the tool. This is commendable, but it has the danger of leading the explanation into the necessity of allowing social laws to rest upon mechanisms alone. The author does not wholly succeed in avoiding this danger. In contrast with the four basic urges of Thomas, there is offered the explanation that man's progress is due to the effort to satisfy three urges, i.e., "the 'instincts to make, to take, to control.'" Coercion is said to intertwine about each group activity. Thus the author subscribes to the conflict theories of society, which he holds is "a mechanical aggregation of several unco-ordinated parts each having an objective." There is a brave leap made from the explanations of Irascible Strong and Trixie Cunning, ancestors whose traits are still much in evidence, to the recognition that the "human being is characterized by self-conscious freedom of choice, purposefulness, and the persistent and unsatisfiable urge to self-realization." Again, this leap is not very successfully executed, the humor indulged in by the author being in part responsible. The shafts of criticism aimed at our present social structure are not without their fine points. The ingenious author has prepared a chart showing how our present day knowledge and activities may be traced to their sources in the primordial past. A good social engineer will have to be called into consultation for those who want to find their way about.

M. J. V.

In his editorial note, Professor E. C. Hayes points out the need for each of the social sciences to see all the others and to see social science as a whole. Seven authorities, Ellwood, Wissler, Gault, Sauer, Clark (J. M.), Merriam, and Barnes, speak for seven phases of social science in this volume. Professor Ellwood summarizes the developments in sociology as (1) the tendency to stress the mental side of social science, (2) to shift from a particularistic to synthetic vein of life, and (3) to develop a composite method of research. Dr Wissler cites the progress in anthropology in terms of several important techniques for research. J. M. Clark indicates that the development in economics includes enlarged emphases on such factors as: objectivity, institutions, evolution, versatility in method, broadening of view. In history, according to Harry Elmer Barnes, the advances include the importance of the history of history, the philosophy of historical writing, the evolutionary hypothesis, anthropological approach, geographical approach. Without having his attention called further to the contents of the volume, the reader can see ample justification for Dr. Hayes’ wish to further the co-ordination of the social sciences. At present, the social sciences not only have widely variant interests and concepts, but each feels superior to the others. In showing some of the points of contradiction, and also of co-ordination, the volume justifies itself.


This is what Dr. Hart describes as “a dramatic highway” of his experiences portraying the quest for a philosophy “which shall reveal the common foundations that underlie the superficial diversities of experiences, and which shall manifest the common patterns that are woven into their variety,” a search for the universal objective. In reality, it is Dr. Hart’s exemplification of some of the best thought of Professor John Dewey whom the author magnanimously acknowledges as one of his chief sources of inspiration. And he has admirably succeeded, as one must testify after reading that splendid chapter on “The Meaning of Habit.” Naturally, habit is apotheosized so that it comes to mean that “society is habit and custom operative in the activities of groups and social beings.” Those ac-
quainted with the four wishes of W. I. Thomas will be interested in the comments on the desire for security. Dr. Hart writes, “The fact seems to be that between security of living and interest in living, there is for most of us, as things now go, a more or less distressing gulf: we can increase security—but must it be only at the expense of interest. . . . Security is a good thing to have in reserve; but it often turns out to be a most boresome thing to live with, very long.” The book is exceptionally worth while in that one lays it down with the feeling that this “dramatic highway” has been remarkably stimulating to reflective thought.

M. J. V.


There are two great values presented in this noteworthy analysis of the Canadian Industrial Disputes Act. The first, and that which will be of importance to sociologists, is Mr. Selekman’s analysis of the changes in attitudes of the labor unions of Canada toward this Act. When his first study was made in 1916, he found that the Unions were hostile to the Act; ten years later, he finds that they are championing the Act. The second value lies in the comprehensive survey of the results of this Canadian law which was primarily designed for the prevention of strikes. At the present time, while strikes have not disappeared, the Canadian Department of Labor, however, has administered the Act in such a way that it may be said to provide the means of a clearing house for disputes between employers and employees. It is thus used as a method of conciliation. The Russell Sage Foundation has interested itself in this study so that the United States may profit, if it will, by the research work undertaken. Says Miss Mary Van Keeck in the preface of the book, “The facts of Canadian experience seems to show that in the United States federal and state governments could wisely develop further their machinery for mediation and conciliation by providing official representation of employers and employees for joint conference in specific disputes.” The author points out that “government bodies can obtain the best results in industrial disputes not by threatening arrest, imprisonment, or fines,” but by seeking to find the planes of possible agreement for the disputants. This is a fine addition to the studies of industrial relations already published by the Foundation.

M. J. V.

Dr. Young has prepared not only the first and only important source book for social psychology, but one that will be difficult to surpass. In reviewing a source book two fundamental questions arise: (1) What is the ground plan or logic of organization, and (2) what source materials have been selected to reveal the ground plan?

The author starts off with "a triple foundation" of materials that present the nature of the social group, of culture, and of the individual. These three variables constitute the recurrent starting points of this treatise. Personality is examined in the light of each of these variables. The social attitudes of personality then are brought to the fore—as arising (1) from the mental patterns of the group, (2) from culture factors, such as myths and legends, and (3) from the person's own reactions to his group and culture worlds, or from his prejudices. The study moves on to the study of leadership phases of personality, and tapers off with materials concerning collective behavior. The logic of this line of analysis is well founded. Some such plan as this is emerging with increasing definiteness in a number of new works, sometimes called social psychology and sometimes sociology.

The difficulty of distinguishing between social psychology and sociology is realized by the author. He meets the dilemma by referring to the study of social groups and behavior as social psychology, to the study of culture patterns as sociology, and to the study of individual organisms as psychology. But this analysis gives to social psychology the position often assigned to sociology, and leaves to the latter, the field already being developed by the social anthropologists.

The choice of source materials indicates wide reading and discretion. Selective rather than exhaustive, direct and clear-cut, these 229 selections, taken together, comprise a valuable unit of stimulating materials.

E. S. B.


To Professor Dewey, the public consists of all those persons "who are affected by the indirect consequences of social transactions to such an extent that they deem it necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for." In this sense the public becomes the essence of shared experiences on a large scale. At times the
public seems to be made synonymous, by the author, with the political state, but on the whole, it is the social, living content of the state that is meant. The public is composed of "human relationships," and yet these today have no political agencies worthy of them. The democratic public "is still largely inchoate and unorganized." A public that holds the sanctity of some form of state "consecrated by the efforts of our fathers and hallowed by tradition is one of the stumbling blocks in the way of orderly and directed change," and invites revolutions. The public cannot find itself except through "shared experiences," and unless there be a restoration of neighborhood and community life. There can be no world community, if we have not yet come to understand those races, some of whose members live "next door" on our street.

Opinion which is created by special interests is not public opinion. We can have the latter only when persons identify themselves with and think in terms of the whole public. Philosophical in approach, the author has advanced hypotheses which psycho-sociological research is likely to find interesting and probably sound. 


Dr. Burrow vigorously challenges the personalistic, systematic method of psychoanalysis. The personal partisanship and bias of the analyst and the client's attempts to differentiate himself and to set up resistances are clarified. The author offers an organic and societal viewpoint as a substitute for the present constricted viewpoint. By taking into account the social basis of life, both the analyst and the client react to each other and to the latter's problems more freely and naturally. Consciousness is seen in a broader light, and neuroses are more easily diagnosed and treated. Children, for example, brought up in an atmosphere of pretense on the part of their elders, "are tricked into complicity with the prevalent code about them" and there is begotten in them "this self-same reaction of pretense." This is but one of countless social factors that the psychiatrist must take into account. Dr. Burrow has rendered psychiatry and psychoanalysis an invaluable service in pointing out a new and sane methodology.

E. S. B.
THE FREEDMEN'S SAVINGS BANK. By WALTER L. FLEMING.

The Freedmen's Saving and Trust Company, organized in 1865, "was one of the few sensible attempts made at the close of the Civil War to assist the ex-slave." "The purpose of this account is to outline the history of the organization, to describe its possibilities, its development, its decline and collapse, and to show how it influenced the Negro."

A poor charter, lack of adequate supervision, political corruption, incompetence of Negro officials, and similar factors, contributed towards the final downfall of this attempt to fit a complex cultural adjustment upon a backward people. Some of the pertinent questions suggested by this sketch are: "What was the effect of the failure of the Bank upon the development of habits of thrift among the Negroes? How did it affect their attitude towards law and government, since most of the depositors thought the solvency of the Bank was guaranteed by the United States government? What is the exact correlation between cultural status and effective types of propaganda, as suggested by the anecdotes, poetry, maxims, and illustrations often printed on the cover of the pass-books?" Rich in suggestions, this compact little volume, with its detailed appendix and index, contains much valuable material contributory to the Negro problem in its more modern phases.

N. N. Puckett


The subtitle of this book, "A Study of the Opposition to and Regulation of Immigration into the United States," indicates the historic nature of the treatise. Tracing the detailed development of immigration restriction from early colonial regulation down to our modern legislation, Professor Garis demonstrates in an interesting manner that "virtually every argument, every means of restriction, and every method of investigation, used in recent years has been used or recommended at various times in our history for over a century." This historic material is offered factually, with little interpretation. To this general treatment, Professor Garis has added a chapter entitled "Back to 1894." This chapter offers an excellent symposium of arguments relative to "the New or the Old Immigration" debate. Other chapters treat of our legislation with reference
to the Chinese and Japanese Immigration. Written from primarily the legal and economic points of view, in these chapters as elsewhere, the book offers but little stress upon America's obligation to the immigrant. The failure to recognize this debt has played, perhaps, an important rôle in the complicating of our immigration problems.

F. S. L.


In this volume, intended to be used as a text in a college course in social problems or in an introductory course in the social sciences, the author begins with society, the good life, and the individual. A discussion of social change follows. Then, the family, education, religion, the state, business, and the community are passed in review. The style is readable to college students and the general public alike. A pleasant atmosphere pervades the entire discussion. Theory is kept in the background. A valuable feature is found in the many succinct summaries of a large number of current sociological books. As a result the reader may become oriented regarding a considerable range of important literature. An extensive teaching-learning technique concludes each chapter. Sixty-three pages of bibliography bring this exceedingly useful volume on social problems to a close.

E. S. B.


This volume is a summary of the literature dealing with the problems of social economics, physical health, and mental hygiene. It is elementary in content and treatment, designed to meet the needs of undergraduate classes in social problems. The treatment is almost wholly expository and little attempt is made to subject the materials to sociological analysis. In fact, the student can use this material whether or not he is familiar with the basic-concepts of economics, sociology, and psychology. The student's interest will no doubt be stimulated by the lucid, systematic treatment of the material, though little is offered which will enable him to relate these social problems to human nature and social organization, to personality and social processes. The author has formulated no scientific theory of social disorganization.

E. F. Y.
BOOK NOTES

THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION. By M. K. Thomson. D. Appleton & Company, New York, 1927, pp. xvi+501. "Motives" is the central topic of this book. Autonomic acts, habits, instincts, emotions, ideas, prejudices, love, values, morale, are all reviewed in relation to motivation. Acquired and substitute motives, negative motives, social motives, economic motives, esthetic motives—these are examined open-mindedly as springs of human action.


THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONALITY. By P. F. Valentine. D. Appleton & Company, New York, 1927, pp. x+393. Writing from an educator’s point of view, the author has combed a wide field of psychological literature and raised many interesting questions such as “Instinct: Tyrant or Ghost?” “Intelligence: A Gift or an Attainment?” The field of personality studies is well surveyed.

ABOUT OURSELVES. By H. A. Overstreet. W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1927, pp. 300. This is a book of lectures developed at the New School for Social Research and printed in a free, informal style on the psychology of personality. It deals with wish-thinking, fixations, phobias, sublimation, humor, the intercreating mind. The treatment is wholesome and constructive.

EXPERIMENTATION AND MEASUREMENT IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION. By Goodwin B. Watson. Association Press, New York, 1927, pp. xii+295. This book contains an unusually valuable compilation of various tests and measurements for studying social attitudes and personality traits. Statistical methods are especially well stressed.

MENTAL GROWTH AND DECLINE. By H. P. Hollingsworth. D. Appleton & Company, New York, 1927, pp. xii+396. The human being is traced in his psychical nature from his pre-natal to post-death stages. Twenty-three interesting psychological laws are stated or restated in the concluding chapter of this well-balanced account.

THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI: A Critical Analysis for Lawyers and Laymen. By Felix Frankfurter. Little, Brown & Company, 1927, pp. 117. Useful to sociologists to show the difficulty of the administration of formal justice when it is in opposition to the fundamental attitudes of the community.


THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE FARMERS WITH THE TOWNS IN PICKAWAY COUNTY, OHIO. Ohio State University, Columbus, 1927, pp. 680.


THE CHURCH AND THE CHANGING CITY. By H. Paul Douglass. George H. Doran & Company, New York, 1927, pp. xvi+453. This is the fourth of a series of studies of urban religious institutions made by the Institute of Social and Religious Research. The first two were general religious surveys of St. Louis, Mo., and Springfield, Mass., and the third involved more detailed study of 1,000 city churches. The recent volume presents case studies of a number of city churches in the upper ranges of urban church development which have been successful in adapting their programs to changing conditions. The method used, which is described in the report, might be characterized as an objective, descriptive and semi-intensive study of contemporaneous institutions, rather than a psychological or sociological description and critical evaluation. Limitations are frankly admitted and pointed out. The report, however, gives a picture of the ever expanding programs of successful modern city churches. From a sociological point of view it would be desirable to have a further description of the social and psychological processes, as well as of the leadership (personalities), which made the "adaptations" possible.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF YOUTH. By Edgar J. Swift. Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1927, pp. xi+342. In this revision of the author’s Youth and Race, published in 1912, the author introduces considerable new materials, and maintains his former facility of style and sprightly use of anecdote. He urges the tapping of the reservoirs of social energy of youth by parents, teachers, and others.


SYMBOLISM. By A. N. Whitehead. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1927, pp. x+88. Philosophical in nature, this monograph raises questions such as the relation of symbolism and direct experiences. Each individual member of society is born into a vast network of inherited symbolism.

KARL MARX’ INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY. By M. M. Barber. Harvard University Press, 1927, pp. x+370. A doctoral dissertation in which Marx’ and Engels’ economic interpretation of history is summarized and criticized, especially because of its narrowness and one-sided nature.

PROHIBITION. By Herman Feldman. D. Appleton & Company, New York, 1927, pp. xv+415. Reports the findings of an impartial comprehensive study of the economic and industrial effects of prohibition. The findings are on the whole favorable to prohibition.

OPIUM: THE DEMON FLOWER. By Sara Graham-Mulhall. Montrose Publishing Company, New York, 1926, pp. xvi+308. An account of how the opium evil is spread, how youth is caught in its grip, and how the evil may be overcome.


Periodical Notes

The Fixation of Vocational Interest. An investigation was made of the vocational interests of four hundred children in a California rural area. Three periods of interest-development are noted, in each of which there appear and operate certain discoverable factors. Brief case records, together with statistical material and reports of experimentations constitute the basic data upon which the report is based. David L. Mackaye, The American Journal of Sociology, November, 1927, pp. 353-370.

The Psychopathology of the Juvenile Delinquent. Previous researches in juvenile delinquency have each approached the problem from their particular point of view and have failed to give us an understanding of delinquency "in all its aspects and under all the conditions under which it may occur"; but the problem will be solved only "when we have investigated all the conditions which are responsible for the delinquent's attitude toward the world, when we have explained the psychogenesis of the antisocial attitude of the individual, when we have obviated the more flagrant causative factors," and "above all, when we have shown the delinquent a better solution of his life's problem." W. Bérum Wolfe, The Journal of Delinquency, September, 1927, pp. 159-169.

The Farmer and His Church—Today. Since 1920, three million farmers have moved into cities. As a result the rural church is suffering. Its strength, built during the early pioneering and homesteading periods, is threatened. Fundamentally, the problem is an economic one. Thousands of farmers are facing bankruptcy. This means the curtailment of their children's education. "The nation that permits the growers of its wheat and corn to fall into such a state is sowing a wind and will some day reap a whirlwind." Seventy per cent of America's churches are rural. Church membership and leadership is drawn largely from rural and small town churches. There must be a solution for the farmer and the farmer's church. The nation needs them both. Fred Eastman, The Christian Century, November 24, 1927, pp. 1386-88.
Research Interests of American Sociologists. A survey was made by means of a questionnaire of the research projects carried on by American sociologists. Some three hundred replies were received, of which two hundred and fifty-nine were complete enough to classify. The research interests are grouped under eighteen headings, with social psychology, education and religion—the church—in the lead. Hugh Carter, Social Forces, December, 1927, pp. 209-212.

Developing Standards of Rural Child Welfare. Miss Abbott indicates some of the lines along which progress has been made in developing standards of rural child welfare, touching on such problems as children of migratory workers, maternity and the infant, delinquency, and mother's pension. Some of the findings of investigations carried on by the Children's Bureau are noted, although the method used in finding the facts is not specifically indicated. Grace Abbott, Hospital Social Service, December, 1927, pp. 495-508.

The Social Survey of Tyneside: An English Regional Social Survey. A partial report of a social survey of an industrial region named Tyneside. It represents a regional survey rather than a study of parts of a large city or of a single town. It does not represent a mere cross-sectional study of a region in a particular year, although the specific study was made in the years 1926 and 1927, but rather constitutes a study of an "area as it changed over a period of about a century." The technique used to secure the data is not specifically indicated, although it is given some attention. Henry A. Mess, The American Journal of Sociology, November, 1927, pp. 424-443.

Behavior Studies of Criminals. Criminologists are making studies of every particular of the criminal, his genesis, heredity, birth, infancy, physical, intellectual, and psychic growth, his aims and desires, and the environment in which he is found striving to work out his life object. The writer points out certain factors which a statistical study of several thousand cases revealed. This study was made in the Joliet (Illinois) penitentiary, of which the present population is 2,960. Factors concerning the general composition as to sex, native and foreign, the intelligence and education, age of crime, the type of crime, home and family of the criminal, and so forth, are noted. Several life histories are given in summary form as samples to indicate the method used in the study. Walter B. Martin, Welfare Magazine, December, 1927, pp. 1581-1591.
Alcoholism among Parents of Juvenile Delinquents. A study was made of parents of the children whom the Central Boston Juvenile Court referred to the Judge Baker Foundation clinic for psychiatric study, indicating that “alcoholism presented, even in 1925, a considerable problem among the parents of delinquent children in Boston, although during recent years the incidence of alcoholism among the fathers has been considerably less than in the years before 1919.” The report constitutes a summary of case studies. Alice Channing, *The Social Service Review*, September, 1927, pp. 357-383.

How to Study the Boys’ Gang in the Open. Dr. Thrasher, the author of *The Gang*, describes the process by means of which one can establish rapport with a boys’ gang for the purpose of study. The technique used by the investigator to win the confidence of a group of boys and to secure spontaneous and natural responses from them is described and illustrated. For the most part a “collective interview” method was used. Questions were addressed to the whole gang which made it possible to obtain information more quickly and with fewer inhibitions than if each boy had been interviewed separately. Frederic M. Thrasher, *The Journal of Educational Sociology*, January, 1928, pp. 244-254.

Some Factors in Success or Failure on Parole. Reports an investigation of the probation and parole system of Wisconsin made by the Department of Sociology of the University of Wisconsin. Material was taken from the records of the state prison and reformatory, using a mixture of the methods of sampling and complete count. About sixteen hundred persons have been paroled from the prison and nineteen hundred from the reformatory. A group of “successes” and a group of “failures” of each institution were studied and compared as to age, marital conditions, use of alcohol, previous record, previous occupation, offenses causing commitment, length of sentence, length of parole period, marks received in the reformatory, superintendent’s recommendations as to parole, place of residence before commitment, type of community to which they were paroled, occupation on parole, earnings, offenses constituting failure on parole, conduct after release from parole. Helen Leland Witmer, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, November, 1927, pp. 384-403.
International Notes

An International Highway is in the offing—to extend from Montreal, Canada, through the United States, and thence into Mexico. It will continue to Panama, and on down the west coast of South America through Peru to Valparaiso, Chile. This trunk highway opens the way to new forms of co-operation and good will. When completed it will constitute a new type of connecting link between nations, providing an intelligent good will prevails in all the countries involved.

At the Institute of International Relations held in Riverside, California, the first week of December, with Dr. Rufus B. von KleinSmid of the University of Southern California as chancellor, interracial problems received primary attention. Significant questions that were discussed included: Should human relations be governed by the principle of racial equality? Do racial differences make racial friction inevitable? Is there any responsibility of a highly developed nation toward one less highly developed? In admitting immigrants, should discrimination be made along racial lines? Should Mexican immigrants be put on the Quota? Does history give evidence of races changing places and of the backward race becoming the advanced one? What are the main causes of race friction? What races, if any, from Asia are culturally unassimilable?

International radio grows apace. Shortly an exchange of programs is to start between America and British broadcast studios. British programs, for instance, are to be relayed across the Atlantic and then re-broadcast over a national network. Simultaneously, American programs are to be broadcast in England. It takes only a little imagination to perceive the vast possibilities for building a new Anglo-American solidarity through radio contacts. But why stop with radio interchanges between these two countries? Only the lack of an international language hinders. Soon the whole world will be listening in to programs “originating” first in one country and then in another. But can we speed up a world viewpoint within each nation before international radio becomes a fact, and then a menace, through the broadcasting of national jealousies and provincial loyalties?
France is planning to restrict the importation of foreign motion-picture films. Films from the United States are to be put on a quota. Moreover, the quota is to change yearly as events dictate. All films from this country are to be "reviewed" by a national motion picture commission, to be composed of three censors, three government officials, three each of authors, producers, managers, and actors. The plan, if adopted, is to go into effect September 1st.

Internationalism as a concept still seems to frighten many people and to anger others. Unfortunately, its use by communists has beclouded its real significance, and raised an army of antagonists against it. In both its generally accepted meaning and its scientific meaning it refers to a culmination of wholesome nationalisms into a superior type of constructive world control. It will conserve all the positive values in nationalisms and eliminate their present inconsistencies. It lays the basis of world peace in law for all nations. It is in the line of historical progress.

"Pessimism is the dominant attitude in England, France, and America," said Will Durant in an address in January at Pasadena, California. He promptly changed "America" to "New York," and declared that in New York intellectual leaders view the future with the gravest misgivings. In New York "the way to be unpopular is to express faith in the future of the human race." It is thought that the World War has brought about the despair, cynicism, and bitterness prevailing in the nations that won the War. On the other hand, "Germany possesses more optimism and hope today than the nations that defeated her."

American-Mexican relations are being reversed with amazing rapidity. Morrow, Will Rogers, Lindbergh, and a more friendly attitude on the part of President Coolidge, are among the factors around which the new friendly relations have arisen. It is to be hoped that the economic interests and private business will not upset the new relationships so auspiciously inaugurated in the fall of 1927. The brusqueness, even brutality, with which the Calles government dealt with the revolution last fall indicates that there is still an underlying fear and a lack of stability in governmental affairs in Mexico. The present Calles and the future Obregon governments are probably the best that can be expected in Mexico for many years to come. They deserve encouragement.
Social Research Notes

Social Distance between occupations is the subject of a research project reported upon in January by Miss Forrest Wilkinson, graduate assistant in sociology, University of Southern California. Both statistical studies and case studies are being made. Using a special social distance test, Miss Wilkinson is gathering data regarding the reactions of persons in one occupation toward persons in other occupations. The reactions toward a person in a given occupation vary according to the occupations of the persons who give the reactions. Moreover, these reactions vary according to such factors as sex, locality, age, educational status, and religion. The comparisons of the findings of case studies with the statistical studies are being examined with reference to discrepancies and variations between the two, and the reasons therefor. A number of specialized problems for research are growing out of this study.

Rural sociologists have been unusually active investigators and have produced a considerable body of literature, mostly descriptions of conditions of rural life. The attitude of reformers rather than that of research students has characterized some of the rural sociologists and their books have been treatises on rural welfare rather than reports of scientific investigations. Furthermore, an undue distinction has been made between rural sociology and general sociology. This differentiation is gradually disappearing; social psychological factors are increasingly emphasized and more scientific methods of research are emerging. Possibly the most significant tendency in rural sociology is the focus of attention on methods of research. The interest in research has received an added stimulus by the passage of the Purnell Act which seeks to promote the improvement of rural life by means of social research. Several of the leading papers presented at the Institute of Research Methods in Rural Sociology held at Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana, April, 1927, appeared in the September issue of the American Journal of Sociology.
The Open Forum in its natural origins and growth was discussed by Haven Davis at a recent research group meeting at the University of Southern California. Mr. Davis is making comparisons of the origins and of the techniques of conducting forums. The changing nature of the forums together with failures and new features are interesting questions. The most difficult research problem of all is to find out what results open forums have upon those who attend. What changes in attitudes and opinions are effected?

The Natural History of Reform Movements was discussed by Roy M. Youngman at the Research Clinic meeting held in December at the University of Southern California. Mr. Youngman is making a number of case studies of past and current reform movements. In the main, these seem to be processual and to be characterized by different stages following some such order as this: (1) aggravation, (2) imitation, (3) discussion, agitation, debate, and organization, (4) outlawry (by vote and by law), and (5) enforcement. The principle of acceleration usually operates as soon as a certain momentum is acquired.

The Child Guidance Clinic of Los Angeles was reported upon by Miss Edith Burleigh, chief of the social service division of the Clinic, at the January meeting of Alpha Kappa Delta (Southern California chapter). A behavior problem child was defined as one who differs in any marked degree from the average. The problems of a child as seen by himself often vary widely from the teacher's or the parents' conceptions of those same problems. In the psychiatrist's conference with the child, the child's statements are often very illuminating. His actions in the presence of his parents as distinguished from his actions when they are not present may speak volumes. Children should love and respect their parents, but on the other hand parents must earn that love and respect—in fact, they can get it in no other way. Parents often judge their children by the adult's standards, but use childish methods in attempting to train their children. The treatment consists in adjusting what a child wishes to do in his heart (desires), and what he may do in society (rules). At the staff conferences held at the Clinic the child's liabilities and his assets are analyzed; the treatment aims to meet or offset the liabilities.
Social Fiction Notes


In this fictional portrayal of a Crô-Magnon community M. Anet, in his own inimitable fashion, continues the exploitation of that rich vein of dramatic material from which Jack London, in his Before Adam, so successfully reconstructed a still earlier human type. While Nô, son of Timaki, of the tribe of the Bear, busies himself with such activities as the chase and the initiation and marriage rites, the probable culture-complex of the late Reindeer Age entrancingly unfolds itself and the archaeologists’ story of prehistoric man in Western Europe takes on an awakened vigor.

Environment looms larger in cultural life when one, through the eyes of Nô, sees the ice-sheets slinking over the northern hills, carrying the indispensable reindeer with them and resulting in the same sort of cultural maladjustment which confronted the plains Indians with the extinction of their buffalo. No better illustrations of the conservatism of culture could be found than the totemic reverence of the almost extinct cave-bear and the power of the ancestral shrines in restraining migration to a more favorable locality. The Crô-Magnon sages continue their painting, sculpture, and other spiritual rites, vainly attempting to attract more bountiful game, even after the round-headed invaders from the North have flooded the country with their packs of domesticated hunting-dogs. Ethnographers usually labor in vain to steep their readers in that primitive atmosphere of magic so effectively conjured up in the dramatic catastrophe which overtakes Nô in his attempt to direct his tribesmen along practical lines of acculturation.

Field studies in the Eyzies and contacts with foremost authorities, both personally and through their writings, have given the author the requisite background of Crô-Magnon and general primitive culture so essential for an undertaking of this sort. The sixty or more authentic outline copies of Paleolithic art scattered throughout the volume add tremendously to the realism of this epic of a bygone civilization.

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